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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
By
KENNETH AUSTIN CASTELLANOS
AUGUST 2021
Committee Chair: Dr. Garth Heutel
Major Department: Economics
The essays in this dissertation discuss modeling techniques for international trade and
their application to environmental policy. In addition, I present evidence of the effect of air
pollution on worker sick leave.
Chapter 1 presents an application of computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling in
environmental policy evaluation. In most CGE models, researchers assume that goods are
differentiated by their origin of production, known as the Armington model of international
trade. In this chapter, I consider their application to carbon taxes, carbon leakage, and border
carbon adjustments (BCAs). BCAs are designed to address carbon leakage, which is a
phenomenon where areas not subject to an emissions tax increase their emissions in response to
regulated areas decreasing emissions. I find that the non-Armington model predicts a higher
carbon leakage rate compared to typical Armington models. I also find that border rebates are
more effective than border tariffs at reducing leakage.
Chapter 2 presents an application of the non-Armington model to the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Previous studies of free trade agreements have shown that the

Armington model may underpredict changes in trade. In this chapter, I build a non-Armington
model that still incorporates observable features of the international trade market. I then simulate
the trade effects from NAFTA, and I compare these results to previous studies. I find that the
non-Armington model can generate larger changes in trade than the Armington model.
Chapter 3 discusses how pollution might affect worker productivity, specifically the
probability of taking sick leave from work. In this chapter, I evaluate these studies using a causal
inference technique to quantify the impact of the CAAA on the number of days workers miss due
to illness. I discuss the possible issues with using simple hazard rates for illness in making
calculations of missed days and I also discuss how paid sick leave may influence results. Using a
DiD framework, I find that the CAAA reduced the probability of taking a sick day in a given
week by 0.1 percentage points.
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Introduction
As research has shown the damages from climate change and air pollution, governments
have begun creating policies to address these issues. In a global economy, the policies that one
region enacts can have spillover effects on other regions. Additionally, determining the economic
benefits from pollution reduction requires the use of empirical analysis. The first chapter of this
thesis focuses on climate policy, the second chapter focuses on international trade modeling, and
the last chapter focuses on policy evaluation of the Clean Air Act Amendments. I first discuss
current questions in carbon policy and international trade. I then compare the predictions from
my international trade model in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement. I
finish by using a causal inference model to analyze the effect of air pollution on sick leave.
When undertaking policy analysis, researchers in government and academia often make
use of computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling. This framework allows for
counterfactual analysis and can incorporate rich data sources on industry supply chains. This can
be especially useful in environmental and trade policy analysis, which often target specific
industries. In environmental policies, emissions intensive sectors such as utilities, manufacturing,
and construction are often heavily affected sectors. In trade policy, tariffs are generally targeted
at highly traded manufacturing industries. CGE models provide tractable ways of evaluating
policy impacts by industry and incorporating the supply chain structure in the analysis.
Most CGE models include international trade by using the Armington model. This model
assumes that importers have preferences over the origin of production of goods (Armington
1969). The Armington model provides a tractable framework for incorporating several
observable features of trade that are typically not present in non-Armington models. However,
some researchers have pointed out problems with the predictions from the Armington model.
1

One such issue is that Armington models will predict finite export supply curve elasticities. The
export supply curve determines the quantity exporters will supply based on the price received
from importers. Recent evidence has suggested that this curve is likely perfectly elastic, even for
big countries like the United States and China (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). This
relationship can be replicated in a general equilibrium model using a non-Armington framework.
The first two chapters of this dissertation develop the method of using a non-Armington model to
analyze government policy.
In chapter 1, I use a non-Armington model to explore how international trade and
environmental policy interact. When implementing taxes on carbon, many countries may worry
about the phenomenon of carbon leakage. This occurs when areas outside of the regulated
country increase production (and by extension emissions) in response to reduced production in
the regulated country. Some have suggested using border carbon adjustments (BCAs) to reduce
carbon leakage and improve the competitiveness of the taxed country in the world market. I
show that a non-Armington model predicts that leakage rates are higher, and BCAs are less
effective. The smaller effectiveness of BCAs is due to the perfectly elastic export supply curve.
If the importing country is unable to push down the output price of the exporting region,
producers will not have an incentive to cut production.
Research has also shown that the Armington model predicts changes in trade volumes
that are smaller than what is observed in the data, sometimes known as the “stuck on zero”
problem (Kuiper and van Tongeren 2007). A well-known example of this is shown in Kehoe
(2005), who directly compares predictions from Armington CGE models of the impacts of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) against the data. Kehoe finds that the
Armington model of trade severely underpredicted the changes in trade seen in the data.
2

In chapter 2, I use a non-Armington model to evaluate the impacts of NAFTA, and I
compare my results against Kehoe (2005). The non-Armington model I build in this chapter
incorporates many of the features in the Armington framework, and I show how these can be
easily implemented using a novel algorithm that builds trade matrices. The Armington model
predicts trade flows using the distribution of prices around the world, and a non-Armington
model only has a single world price for each commodity. Thus, to predict trade flows in the nonArmington model, I use the distribution of quantities around the world rather than the
distribution of prices. I find that the non-Armington model can generate larger changes in trade
that were more consistent with the data after the implementation of NAFTA.
In chapter 3, I evaluate the effect of the Clean Air Act Amendment (CAAA) on the
number of days that workers call in sick. I first discuss the difficulties in predicting the effects of
less pollution on worker sick leave. Even if one can identify the reduction in days of illness (the
hazard rate), other margins may make it difficult to correctly determine the impact on sick leave.
For example, some workers may shift along the intensive margin and attend work while sick, or
they may engage in some other mitigating behaviors. Additionally, if some workers are covered
by paid sick leave policies, this relationship becomes even more confounded. To evaluate the
accuracy of simulation models, I use a difference-in-difference model to determine the policy
impact of the CAAA. Since, the CAAA only regulated some counties’ pollution levels, and I use
this geographic heterogeneity to identify a causal impact. I find that the CAAA reduced the
probability of taking a sick day by 0.1 percentage points.
Using models is a wonderful way to understand complex interactions in the world and
provide insight for policy. However, we must take our models to the data to ensure that we are
providing a framework that can accurately describe those relationships. We must also be willing
3

to use different models for different purposes. An overarching theme in this dissertation is an
attempt to do just that. In chapters 1 and 2, I show that relationships in international trade may be
better described using a non-Armington model. In chapter 3, I discuss how to evaluate the
empirical predictions of air pollution simulation models. All models have strengths and
weaknesses and identifying when to use a model is a crucial part of research.

4

Chapter 1: Carbon Policy and International Trade
1.1 Introduction
Carbon pricing initiatives have been growing, and policymakers often focus on how to
implement carbon taxes efficiently. One concern has often been how international trade is
affected by carbon taxes. Policymakers may be concerned from an environmental standpoint and
want to know the amount of carbon leakage from implementing these policies. Leakage is a
phenomenon where production (and emissions) shifts to an untaxed country. Policymakers may
also be worried from an economic standpoint and look at variables such as employment and
gross domestic product (GDP) impacts. When analyzing the economic impact of these policies,
governments and researchers often use computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling to
predict how a domestic policy will impact trade. CGE models typically employ the Armington
model of international trade, which assumes that goods are differentiated by origin of production.
In this paper, I investigate how removing the Armington assumption affects predictions in CGE
modeling of climate policy.
Recent carbon pricing proposals by politicians in the United States (US) and European
Union (EU) have often included border carbon adjustments (BCAs), which are policies designed
to increase the price of imports from countries without carbon prices and rebate domestic
producers for carbon taxes paid in production when they export to countries without carbon
prices (Morris, 2018; Hafstead, 2019). Some researchers have questioned their effectiveness
from a welfare standpoint (Kortum and Weisbach, 2017; Fullerton, Baylis, and Karney, 2013).
However, most CGE models have predicted that BCAs are effective at reducing carbon leakage.
A survey of 11 CGE models found that models predicted BCAs reduce leakage for the United

5

States (US) by about 30% on average, with some predicting a more than 50% reduction
(Böhringer, Balisteri, and Rutherford 2012).
Most models used to study BCAs make use of the Armington model of international
trade. The Armington model was developed by Paul Armington in 1969 and is still a popular
way of modeling trade in environmental trade models half a century later (Armington 1969). The
primary reason for using the Armington model is that it predicts three established features of
international trade markets: imperfect specialization, home bias, and cross-hauling. Imperfect
specialization is the observation that countries do not perfectly specialize like in the classical
Ricardian comparative advantage model. Home bias is the observation that countries tend to buy
more from domestic sources than international ones. Cross-hauling is the observation that
countries import and export the same product category. These features were absent in the
traditional trade models of Armington’s time, the Ricardian model, and its variant, the
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model.
While the Armington model is a useful model for incorporating real-world trade patterns,
it also predicts a finite export elasticity. This means that when a country puts a tariff on an
import, the exporting country will experience a decrease in the market price for their output. In
other words, the exporter and importer share the burden of the tariff. Recent evidence from the
trade war between the US and China, however, have shown that the entire burden of a tariff falls
on the importer. This is consistent with a perfectly elastic export supply curve (Amiti, Redding,
and Weinstein 2019). To incorporate this observation into my analysis, I specify a nonArmington small economy model, which generates perfectly elastic supply curves (Clarete and
Roumasset 1987).

6

Only a few papers have considered environmental policy using models other than
Armington trade. A recent paper used two non-Armington models to examine carbon leakage: a
HO model and an imperfect competition model (Balistreri, Böhringer, and Rutherford 2018).
Another paper uses a similar imperfect competition model to look at BCAs (Balistreri and
Rutherford 2012). In both papers, the authors find that non-Armington models predict higher
leakage rates, which is a result I confirm in this paper. I extend this literature by considering
BCA policies in a perfectly competitive non-Armington framework. This model also differs by
including a gravity framework in explaining trade flows. I also explore why the Armington
assumption may overstate production changes abroad due to how it allocates the burden of a
tariff.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effects of carbon policy under a model that
does not invoke the Armington assumption or imperfect competition. To do this, I develop a
CGE model that allows for goods to be homogenous by origin of production and predicts trade
flows using a gravity model. I assume firms in each region have access to unique supply chain
technology and labor markets. This approach is useful because data is readily available to
calibrate the model; builders only need an environmentally extended social accounting matrix
and parameter estimates from previous literature. My model employs a solution method based on
a neoclassical Arrow-Debreu economy that allows markets to clear on global prices (Feltenstein
and Plassmann 2008). I extend previous non-Armington CGE models to include trade flows
predicted by a gravity equation, which allows me to incorporate essential features of trade in a
homogeneous representative firm model.
I find that leakage from carbon taxes is higher in my non-Armington model than in most
previous Armington models, which confirms earlier work on this topic. I extend the literature to
7

show how the structure of BCAs become important for their impact on leakage. Specifically, a
tariff increases leakage rates, and a rebate decreases them. A tariff does not decrease leakage
rates because the tariff imposing country has very little effect on the world price. As a result,
they are unable to incentivize foreign producers to reduce their output. A typical BCA is a
combination of a tariff and a border rebate. The tariff is for carbon used to make an import in an
untaxed country, and the rebate is for carbon taxes paid to make an export to an untaxed country.
I find that these policies roughly offset each other so BCAs have a smaller effect on leakage than
in Armington models. BCAs also have almost no effect on economic variables such as the
aggregate labor supply, aggregate wage rate, and gross domestic product (GDP). I also explore
how my assumptions about trade flows and parameters affect predictions about emissions and
economic variables. However, even under many different calibrations, I still find that BCAs only
modestly decrease carbon leakage on average. In general, I find that the Armington assumption
is crucial to our predictions about the effects of carbon policy and border adjustments.
In the next section, I show the model construction for production, households, and
government. I also explain how the model predicts trade flows and how it differs from the
traditional Armington framework. In section 1.3, I discuss the dataset and parameter choices for
the model application. In section 1.4, I show results from policy simulations and then explore
how my parameterizations may affect the results.

1.2 Model Description
In this model, I use a Shoven and Whalley type general equilibrium structure (Shoven
and Whalley 1984). One of the benefits of using CGE methodology is that common datasets,
such as input-output matrices, and neoclassical functional forms allow for standardized
8

application (Hosoe, Gasawa, and Hashimoto 2010, Dixon and Jorgenson 2012). To begin the
model, I assume there are 𝑁 regions, each with 𝐽 representative firms. Each firm makes a single
type of output distinguished by its industry (e.g., agriculture goods). If this output is traded in the
international market, it is homogeneous by origin, has a single world price, and can be sold to
any region. If it is non-tradable, the output is only sold domestically to buyers in the region the
firm is located in.
Each region has a single representative household, a government that taxes and transfers,
and a set of representative firms for each industry. I assume that utilities are the only nontradable good, so this service has a local market price in each region. I list all the industries I use
in the application in Table 1.1. I assume that labor is the only factor that is immobile between
regions. This assumption is typical of Ricardian models, and researchers have observed that
labor markets are generally less mobile internationally than either capital or commodity markets
(Freeman 2006). I also assume that labor is sticky between industries. This assumption prevents
a region from entirely specializing and moving all labor to a single industry.

1.2.a Production
I model production as a nested structure, which is common in CGE models. Figure 1.1
shows a diagram of the production process. Production is assumed to be constant returns to scale,
and all firms are price-takers. The firm receives the market price for the goods they sell, and they
pay market prices for any inputs. If they sell a tradable good, they receive the world price; if the
firm sells a non-tradable good, they receive the regional price. Buyers may pay a domestic price
that is higher than the world price for a tradable good if tariffs are levied on the product.

9

Figure 1.1: Organization of Production Process

Notes: This shows the production process for each firm. The process can be viewed from the
bottom-up. First producers decide optimal inputs for fossil fuels and intermediate goods ad create
the intermediate goods composite. This is combined with capital to create a materials composite,
and finally materials and labor combine to produce a final output.

10

Table 1.1: List of Industries and Regions
Industries/Commodities
Regions
Coal Extraction1
China
Oil Extraction
Europe
1
Natural Gas Extraction
North America
Agriculture
(Canada & Mexico)
Mining2
United States
Goods Manufacturing2
Rest of the World
1
Petroleum Refining
Chemical Manufacturing
Other Manufacturing
Utilities*
Construction
Consumer Services
Transportation
Business Services
Social Services
Notes: This is a list of industries and regions used in the model. The industries were chosen for
their sensitivity to carbon taxes and aggregated from the world input-output database. Regions
Europe, North America, and Rest of the World are aggregated regions from countries in the
WIOD.
1
Grouped as a carbon emitting fuel and subject to carbon tax.
2
Considered a carbon rich production process and subject to a carbon tariff.
*Utilities are a non-tradable commodity, so they receive a regional price.

A firm solves a cost minimization problem for each nest and then uses that solution to
determine optimal demands for upper nests. For example, a firm will determine the optimal mix
of fossil fuels to create a fossil fuel composite. This input is an imaginary good that is simply a
bundle of the optimal combination of fossil fuels in the previous nest. The fossil fuel composite
is then combined with all other commodities to create the intermediate composite. The
intermediate composite is then combined with capital to make the materials composite, and the
materials composite is combined with labor to create a final product.
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There are three nests combined using constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
𝑗

𝑗

functions. I define 𝑌𝑛ℎ as the output of composite ℎ in region 𝑛 for industry 𝑗 and 𝑋𝑛𝑖 is input 𝑖 in
the composite for industry 𝑗 in region 𝑛. The subscript ℎ indicates which nest the firm is
optimizing fossil fuel, intermediate, or materials. The index 𝑖 can represent any industry in Table
1.1 or any composite formed by the firm as an input to the upper nests. For the fossil fuel nest,
inputs consist of coal, crude oil, and natural gas. For the intermediate composite, inputs are the
remaining goods and services listed in Table 1.1, along with the fossil fuel composite good. The
materials nest takes two inputs: capital and the intermediate composite good. The producer’s
problem for each CES nest is defined as
𝐻
𝑗

𝑗

min ∑(𝑃𝑛𝑖 + 𝜏𝑛𝑖 )𝑋𝑛𝑖
𝑖=1

𝑠. 𝑡.

𝑗

𝑌𝑛ℎ =

𝜎ℎ
𝐻
𝜎ℎ
𝜎ℎ −1 𝜎ℎ −1
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝛾𝑛ℎ 𝜎ℎ −1 (∑ 𝛼𝑛𝑖 𝑋𝑛𝑖 𝜎ℎ )
𝑖=1

Firms minimize the cost of the composite subject to a CES production function. The price vector
𝑗

𝑃𝑛𝑖 is the net price of input 𝑖 to firm 𝑗 in region 𝑛, which is augmented by the tax 𝜏𝑛𝑖 on good 𝑖 in
region 𝑛. This tax is inclusive of any carbon taxes and tariffs. Since the composites are created
within the firm, the price of a composite as an input to a higher nest can differ by industry 𝑗.
𝑗

𝑘
However, for market goods, the firm pays the market price of the good. So, 𝑃𝑛𝑖 = 𝑃𝑛𝑖
∀𝑗, 𝑘 if 𝑖 is

a non-traded market good, i.e., all prices are the same for every buyer in a region for non-traded
𝑗

𝑘
goods. If 𝑖 is a traded good, then 𝑃𝑛𝑖 = 𝑃𝑚𝑖
∀𝑗, 𝑘, 𝑛, 𝑚, i.e., all firms in all regions see the same

global price for traded goods. For each composite ℎ, there are 𝐻 number of inputs, so the term in
12

parentheses is a combination of all the inputs that go into composite ℎ. The share parameter is
𝑗

𝑗

𝛼𝑛𝑖 for input 𝑖 and the shift parameter is 𝛾𝑛ℎ for composite ℎ and both are unique by region and
industry. The cost of any composite is the expenditure function evaluated at optimal demand
quantities. Finally, the substitution parameter 𝜎ℎ is unique to each composite or nest. Estimates
for 𝜎ℎ are taken from the literature, and the rest of the parameters are calibrated from a dataset on
world production and trade. Equation 1 below is the input demand function for producers.
𝑗 𝜎ℎ

𝑗

𝑋𝑛𝑖
𝑗

𝑌𝑛ℎ

=

𝑗

𝛼𝑛𝑖 (𝑃𝑛𝑖 + 𝜏𝑛𝑖 )
𝜎ℎ
𝑗
𝛾𝑛ℎ 1−𝜎ℎ

𝑗 −𝜎
𝑗
(∑𝐻
(𝑃𝑛𝑖
𝑖=1 𝛼𝑛𝑖

−𝜎ℎ

(1)
−𝜎ℎ
1−𝜎ℎ 1−𝜎ℎ

+ 𝜏𝑛𝑖 )

)

𝑗

𝑗

Here optimal input demand 𝑋𝑛𝑖 is expressed as a function per unit of output 𝑌𝑛ℎ .
Transportation costs are defined explicitly in this model. This captures emissions from
transportation use and model changes in costs due to changes in trade volumes. I assume that the
demand for transportation services is a function of international shipping distance and a constant
domestic cost. If a firm begins exporting to further distances, their demand for transportation
services increases. The production function for the transportation composite is defined:
𝑗

𝑗
𝑌𝑛(𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝)

=

𝑋𝑛(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠)
exp (η1 ln (

𝑗
∑𝑁
2j
𝑧=1 𝐹𝑧𝑛 𝐷𝑧𝑛
) + 𝜂n )
𝑗
𝑁
∑𝑧=1 𝐹𝑧𝑛

(2)

The left-hand side is the output of the transportation composite. The numerator of the right-hand
side is the input demand for the transportation composite. In the denominator, the first term
𝑗

inside the exponentiation is the international shipping cost. The variable 𝐹𝑧𝑛 is the amount of
good 𝑗 that is transported from origin 𝑛 to destination 𝑧, and the parameter 𝐷𝑧𝑛 is the distance
between those regions. Taking the two summations together gives the average distance a

13

commodity travels weighted by trade flows. As the average shipping distance increases, the
amount of transportation services required to make a unit of the transportation composite input
also increases. This relationship is determined by the slope parameter η1 . The second term in the
2j

denominator, ηn represents the domestic cost, which I assume is constant with respect to
distance.
Final production is a Cobb-Douglas combination of the materials composite and labor.
The production function is specified as:
𝑗
𝑄𝑛

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

=

𝑗

𝑗
𝑗 𝜔𝑛 𝑗 1−𝜔𝑛
𝛾𝑝𝑛 𝑚𝑛 𝐿𝑛

𝑗

Where 𝑄𝑛 , 𝑚𝑛 , and 𝐿𝑛 represent total output, materials composite input, and labor input,
𝑗

𝑗

respectively, for industry 𝑗 in region 𝑛. The share parameter 𝜔𝑛 and scale parameter 𝛾𝑝𝑛 are
calibrated using my dataset and vary by industry and region. Using first-order conditions and the
expenditure function gives the demands for materials based on input prices and the industry’s
output price:
𝑗

𝑗
𝑚𝑛

=(

𝜔𝑛
𝑗
𝑃𝑛𝑚

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

) (𝑃𝑛 − 𝑆𝑛 )𝑄𝑛

(3)

𝑗

1 − 𝜔𝑛
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝐿𝑛 = (
) (𝑃𝑛 − 𝑆𝑛 )𝑄𝑛
𝑗
𝑤𝑛

(4)
𝑗

These are common Cobb-Douglas expenditure share demand functions, where 𝑃𝑛𝑚 is the per𝑗

𝑗

unit cost of the materials composite and 𝑤𝑛 is the wage rate. The output price is 𝑃𝑛 and some
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

firms may get a per-unit subsidy of 𝑆𝑛 . If good 𝑗 is a tradable good, then 𝑃𝑛 = 𝑃𝑚 ∀ 𝑛, 𝑚, i.e., all
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regions have the same world output price. Note that this equality would not hold in an
Armington model, as output prices are determined by the firm’s location. Market inputs (noncomposite inputs) have prices equal to the corresponding industry’s output price. If 𝑗 is a non𝑗

𝑘
tradable good, 𝑃𝑛 = 𝑃𝑛𝑗
∀ 𝑗, 𝑘, i.e., the price of market input 𝑗 to firm 𝑘 in region 𝑛 is equal to
𝑗

𝑘
the output price of industry 𝑗 in region 𝑛. If 𝑗 is a tradable good, 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑃𝑛 = 𝑃𝑚𝑗
∀ 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝑛, 𝑚, so,

all firms in all regions pay the world price of output from industry 𝑗.
Equations 1-4 describe the production process for an arbitrary firm 𝑗 in region 𝑛.
Together they give a system of input demand equations. Intermediate input and capital demands
are determined from equations 1-3 and labor demands are determined by equation 4. This is a
flexible and common structure used by CGE models, and the model can be easily calibrated to
baseline data using existing methods. With these equations in hand, I now turn to the household
sector.

1.2.b Households
There is one representative household for each region, which owns initial endowments of
capital and labor. Capital is internationally mobile, and all households can supply capital to the
world market at the world price. I also make the common Ricardian assumption that households
can only supply labor to the home region. Access to labor markets is partly how the model drives
trade from comparative advantage.
The utility function for the household is quasi-linear between consumption and leisure
and defined for each region 𝑛. The variable 𝐶𝑛 is a Cobb-Douglas consumption composite of all
𝑗
goods and services, and the lowercase 𝑐𝑛 is consumption of good 𝑗 in region 𝑛. 𝑃̂𝑛 is a price
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index representing the cost of a unit of aggregate consumption 𝐶𝑛 . Note that prices are
augmented by total taxes 𝜏𝑛𝑗 , which like the producer’s problem, is inclusive of all carbon taxes,
tariffs, and subsidies. The variable 𝑤𝑛 is the aggregate wage in the region, and 𝑟 is the global
̅𝑛 and a government
price of capital. Each household also receives an allocation of capital 𝐾
transfer, 𝐺𝑛 , which is determined by tax revenue.
1

(𝐿̅𝑛 − 𝑙𝑛 )1+𝜈
𝑈𝑛 (𝐶𝑛 , 𝑙𝑛 ) = 𝐶𝑛 + 𝜇𝑛
1
1+𝜈
s.t.
̅𝑛 + 𝐺𝑛
𝑃̂𝑛 𝐶𝑛 = 𝑤𝑛 𝑙𝑛 + 𝑟𝐾
where
𝐽

𝐶𝑛 =

𝐽

𝑗 𝜃𝑛𝑗
∏(𝑐𝑛 )
𝑗=1

𝑗

𝑃𝑛 + 𝜏𝑛𝑗
)
and 𝑃̂𝑛 = ∏ (
𝜃𝑛𝑗

𝜃𝑛𝑗

𝑗=1

Each household is allocated 𝐿̅𝑛 units of labor, of which they supply 𝑙𝑛 to the market and
keep the rest as leisure. Taking FOCs and solving for the demand for leisure gives the market
labor supply function.
𝜈

𝑤𝑛
𝑙𝑛 = 𝐿̅𝑛 − (
)
𝜇𝑛 𝑃̂𝑛

(5)

Demand for commodities is a Cobb-Douglas demand curve or fixed share of income.
𝜈

𝑗

𝑗
𝑐𝑛

𝜃𝑛
𝑤𝑛
̅𝑛 + 𝐺𝑛 )
= 𝑗 (𝑤𝑛 [𝐿̅𝑛 − (
) ] + 𝑟𝐾
𝜇𝑛 𝑃̂𝑛
𝑃̂𝑛
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(6)

The equations above only model aggregate labor market and consumption behavior for a
region. Households must also choose the industries to which they will supply labor. In many
models, labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile between industries. If labor is perfectly mobile
in this model, workers will all move to the industry with the highest wage, and the country will
completely specialize. Perfect specialization is not observed in real-world data, so I impose that
labor is sticky between industries. Feltenstein and Plassmann (2008) make a stronger assumption
that labor is completely immobile between industries. I relax this requirement by using an
exponential share function. Equation 7 shows how labor is distributed across industries based on
wages.

𝐿𝑠𝑛𝑖

𝑟
exp(𝜑𝑛𝑖 𝑤𝑛𝑖
+ Φni )
= 𝑁
𝑙
∑𝑗=1 exp (𝜑𝑛𝑗 𝑤𝑗𝑟 + Φnj ) 𝑛

(7)

𝐿𝑠𝑛𝑖 is the labor supplied by the household in region 𝑛 to industry 𝑖. Labor supply for an industry
is determined as a share of overall allocated labor, which is then multiplied by the aggregate
𝑟
labor supplied to the region, 𝐿̅𝑠𝑛 . The variable 𝑤𝑛𝑖
is the relative wage, which is the wage in

industry 𝑖 divided by the average wage in region 𝑛. The first parameter is the sector elasticity,
𝜑𝑛𝑖 , and determines the change between industries in response to a change in relative wages. If
the sector elasticity is set to zero, labor becomes completely immobile between industries. The
second parameter Φ𝑛𝑖 is the share parameter and is calculated such that the base case equilibrium
matches benchmark data.

1.2.c Trade Flows, Tariffs, and Rebates
One issue with using a non-Armington model is incorporating empirically observed
features of trade markets such as cross-hauling, home bias, and no perfect specialization. Part of
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this is taken care of in the structure of the firm and household. Up to this point, I have closely
matched the non-Armington model presented in Feltenstein and Plassmann (2008), which
prevents complete specialization by restricting the labor market. One drawback of this model is
that it does not generate trade flows. If I were to solve this model as is, I would know how much
of a commodity each region produced and bought, but not how those buyers and sellers are
matched. The two previous models, Balistreri et. al. (2018) and Feltenstein and Plassmann
(2008), use regions’ net trade positions, production minus consumption, as a measure of trade.
This may understate tariffs, however, if regions engage in cross-hauling. To account for this, I
predict trade flows using information on previous trade flows and principles from the gravity
trade model literature.
I define a function 𝑇(∙) that predicts trade flows given a vector of regions’ supply and
demand shares and a set of parameters.
𝐅𝑗 = 𝑇 (𝐷 𝑗 , 𝑆𝑗 , 𝐀(𝝉𝑗(𝑏𝑐) ; 𝜃1𝑗 , 𝜽2𝑗 ))

(8)

This function outputs a trade matrix 𝐅𝑗 that describes the trade flows between the regions for a
𝑗

good 𝑗. Each element 𝐹𝑛𝑧 in the matrix 𝐅𝑗 is the share of world production that is sent from
origin 𝑧 to destination 𝑛. I give an example of a trade matrix for the goods manufacturing
industry in appendix Table A.7. Each row is the destination of a good, and each column is the
origin. Intraregional trade is on the diagonal, so this is a measure of home bias. This function has
three inputs: shares of world demand 𝐷 𝑗 (𝑛), shares of world supply 𝑆𝑗 (𝑛), and a matrix 𝐀 which
is calculated from the baseline parameters and border costs. The matrix 𝐀 contains the predicted
shares of consumption based on government border costs such as import tariffs or export
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subsidies, represented by 𝝉𝑗(𝑏𝑐) . This matrix also uses a scalar parameter, 𝜃1𝑗 , and an NxN
matrix of parameters 𝛉2𝑗 .
The function 𝑇(∙) does not have a closed-form expression when N > 2, instead it uses row
operations to calculate the trade matrix. However, below is an approximation of the trade flow
prediction to better explain this portion of the model.
𝑗

𝑗
𝐹𝑛𝑧

≈

𝑎𝑛𝑧 𝐷 𝑗 (𝑛)
𝑗
𝑗
∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑎𝑛𝑖 𝐷 (𝑖)

𝑆𝑗 (𝑧)

j(br)

𝑗

(9)

2𝑗

exp ((1 − 𝜃1𝑗 ) ln (1 + τ𝑛𝑧 ) + 𝜃𝑛𝑧 )

𝑎𝑛𝑧 = [
]
j(br)
𝑁
2
1𝑗
∑𝑖=1 exp ((1 − 𝜃 ) ln (1 + τ𝑛𝑧 ) + 𝜃𝑛𝑖 )
Equation 9 would hold with equality if N=2, i.e., a bilateral model with two regions – home and
foreign. The full algorithm that calculates 𝑇(∙) for N>2 is used in the application and presented
in chapter 2 section 2.3. Looking at equation 9, the importer’s demand 𝐷 𝑗 (𝑛) and the supplier’s
𝑗

production 𝑆𝑗 (𝑧) are multiplied together as in the standard gravity equation. The variable 𝑎𝑛𝑧 is
the effect of border (br) taxes such as import tariffs and export subsidies, which are denoted as
j(br)

τ𝑛𝑧 . The effect of border costs depends on two parameters; the first is 𝜃1𝑗 , which is a trade
𝑗

elasticity parameter. The second parameter is 𝜃𝑛𝑧 , which is calculated to match the equilibrium
to the baseline data. This differs from the traditional Armington model by using relative
quantities of production and consumption instead of relative prices.
This framework is comparable to the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model that combines a
Ricardian model with a gravity equation. In that paper, the authors assume a continuum of

19

heterogeneous goods made by firms with productivities determined by a Fréchet distribution.
The model presented here is similar, except I do not make distribution assumptions about
productivity. Instead, I assume representative firms create homogenous goods, factor availability
and supply chain linkages determine comparative advantage, and then the gravity function
determines trade flows. I compare my method of predicting trade flows to the traditional
Armington model later in the paper after introducing and describing the dataset.

1.2.d Government
The government performs two functions, levying taxes and transferring income. For this
paper, the government taxes CO2 emissions and imports. Governments may also subsidize
exports to other countries, which is given to the exporting firm. Taxes enter the model in the
producer’s problem through equation 1 and in the consumer’s problem through equation 6 (the
price index 𝑃̂𝑛 includes taxes). I separate taxes into two parts, a carbon tax and a border cost.
𝑗(𝑏𝑐)

𝑗

𝜏𝑛 = 𝜏𝑛
𝑁
(𝑏𝑐)
𝜏𝑛𝑗

=𝑃 ∑

𝑗

(11)

𝑅𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑧

(12)

∑𝑁 𝐹 𝑗
𝑧=1 𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖

𝑗

=𝑃 ∑
𝑗(𝑐)

𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑧

𝑗

𝐹𝑧𝑛

∑𝑁 𝐹 𝑗
𝑧=1 𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖

𝜏𝑛

(10)

𝑗

𝐹𝑛𝑧

𝑗

𝑁
𝑗
𝑆𝑛

𝑗(𝑐)

+ 𝜏𝑛

𝑗

= 𝑐𝑐𝑛 × 𝑇𝑎𝑥$/𝐶𝑂2

𝑗

(13)

Equation 10 is the total tax on a commodity in a region, which is the sum of tariffs and any
applicable carbon taxes. Equation 11 calculates the tariff rate using the trade flows calculated
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𝑗

earlier. The term

𝐹𝑛𝑧
𝑗

∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐹𝑛𝑖

is the share of good 𝑗 purchased in region 𝑛 that comes from region 𝑧. I
𝑗

multiply this by the sum of the tariff rate 𝑛 sets on goods from 𝑧, 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑧 . Trade flows are also
partially determined by tariff rates, as shown in the previous section. This also assumes that the
country is a price taker, sellers will not accept lower than the world price. So, the only affect a
country has on the world price, 𝑃𝑗 , is through its effect on world demand and supply. Since this
is small compared to the size of the tariff, the home country bears the burden of the tariff.
Similarly, the subsidy to firms in equations 3 and 4 is calculated in equation 12. The subsidy is
calculated using trade flows and the rebate rate for goods exported from origin 𝑛 to destination 𝑧,
𝑗

𝑅𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑧 . Again, the country is a price taker, so firms can only affect the world price through
their effect on world supply. The means the exporting firm gets the full benefit of the rebate.
In equation 13, carbon taxes are calculated based on the content of carbon emissions
released when a unit of fuel is consumed. The amount of carbon emissions released is calculated
𝑗

using a carbon coefficient 𝑐𝑐𝑛 , which is the amount of CO2 released when a unit of good 𝑗 is
consumed. As this tax is levied when the fuel is burned, it allows the cost of carbon to be fully
integrated into upstream prices through the supply chain. This also assumes that firms are not
able to abate carbon at the intensive margin with technology such as scrubbers or carbon capture
devices. I should also point out that this is considered production-based accounting of emissions
in contrast to consumption-based accounting. While neither is the “correct” way to measure
emissions, this production-based method gives the geographic source of the emission by tying it
to where the fuel was burned. A consumption-based method would assign emissions based on
where the final product was consumed.
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1.2.e Equilibrium Solution
Equations 1-4 determine input demands for production, and equations 5-7 determine
factor supplies and household consumption demands. Trade flows are calculated using equation
8, which determines transportation costs in equation 2 and border costs in equation 1 and
equations 3 through 7. Equilibrium is defined as a point where these equations hold for all
industries and households and where commodity and capital markets clear.
𝐽
𝑗
𝑐𝑛

𝑗

𝑖
+ ∑ 𝑋𝑛𝑗
= 𝑄𝑛 ∀ 𝑛 ∈ {1, … , 𝑁}

(14)

𝑖=1
𝑁

𝐽

𝑁

𝑖
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑛𝑗
𝑛=1 𝑖=1

= ∑ 𝑄𝑛

𝑁

𝑗
∑ 𝑐𝑛
𝑛=1

+

𝑗

𝑛=1

𝐽

𝑁

𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝐾𝑛
𝑛=1 𝑗=1

̅𝑛
= ∑𝐾

𝑁

(15)

(16)

𝑛=1

Equation 14 is the market-clearing condition for non-tradables, which must clear for each
region, and equation 15 is the market-clearing condition for all other tradable commodities. In
both equations, the left-hand side is the sum of consumer and intermediate demand for the
commodity, and the right-hand side is total output. Equation 16 clears the capital market. The
left-hand side is the global demand for capital input across all firms in all regions, which is
determined by equations 1 and 4. The right-hand side is the sum across all household capital
allocations.
To conduct policy experiments, I first simulate a base case scenario, which is the
equilibrium with no carbon policy. I then introduce the new policies, such as carbon taxes and
BCAs, and simulate the counterfactual scenario. This counterfactual is compared to the base case
to determine the impact of the policies. Equilibrium is found numerically using a simplex
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method based on Scarf’s algorithm (Scarf and Hansen 1973). Due to the numerical calculation of
trade flows, the equation for this may not be differentiable at all points; for example, it may have
kinks or sharp turns. The simplex method I employ proves useful over Newton methods in that it
can handle these types of non-differentiable equations.

1.2.f Differences Between Models
The most important difference between the non-Armington and Armington model, for the
purposes of this paper, is how tariffs and rebates affect domestic prices. In an Armington model,
tariffs and rebates both reduce carbon leakage, which is confirmed numerically by several studies
mentioned previously. In the non-Armington model, a rebate may be able to reduce leakage, but
a tariff likely will not.
To simplify the analysis, consider an Armington model with two regions, home and
foreign. Suppose that the home country has already imposed a carbon tax and is trying to control
leakage through border controls. This means they need to increase the home firm’s share of
world production and decrease the share of the foreign firm. Figure 1.2 shows the effect of a
tariff and rebate for an arbitrary polluting good in an Armington world. The left two panels show
the market for goods produced by the home firm and the right column of panels show the market
for goods produced by the foreign firm. Since these goods are differentiated by where they are
produced, they face separate downward sloping demand curves. First, look at the top two panels,
which show the impact of a carbon tariff. The home country imposes a tax on foreign produced
goods, which shifts the demand curve for the foreign good inward. The price for the foreign good
falls, and a movement along the supply curve leads to the foreign firm supplying less to the
market.
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Figure 1.2: Impact of a BCA in an Armington Model

Notes: These four graphs show the effect of a tariff and a rebate for an arbitrary polluting good
under the Armington assumption. The left panels show the market for goods produced at home
and the right panels show the market for goods produced in a foreign country. In the top panels,
the home country imposes a tariff on foreign goods. The demand curve for foreign goods shifts
inward, and the demand for home goods shifts out due to the substitution effect. The supply
curve for the home country also shifts inward since the tariff is on the home country’s inputs.
The bottom two panels show the effect of a rebate to firms in the home country. The supply
curve shifts out, and there is a movement along the demand curve. The new lower price causes
consumers to substitute away from foreign goods, and the demand curve for foreign goods shifts
inward.
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Figure 1.3: Impact of a Tariff and Rebate in a Non-Armington Small Country Model
Home

oreign

World Market

Home

oreign

World Market

Tariff

Rebate

Notes: This figure shows results the impact of a tariff and rebate for an arbitrary polluting good.
The right panels show the world supply and demand, the center panels show the foreign firm
supply, and the left panels show the home firm supply. Since home and foreign are price takers,
they face a perfectly horizontal demand curve equal to the world price. In the top panels a tariff
shifts world demand and supply inward. However, only the home firm’s inputs are taxed, so their
supply curve shifts inward. In the bottom panels, a rebate shifts world supply out, lowering the
world price, but only the home firm’s supply curve shifts outward.

Through the substitution effect, the demand curve for the good produced at home shifts
outward. Polluting goods often use other polluting goods as inputs in intermediate consumption,
so the home firm’s inputs are being taxed, and their supply curve shifts inward. This leads to a
higher price for the home good and an ambiguous effect on the quantity supplied. However, it is
very likely that the quantity reduction for the home firm is smaller than that of the foreign firm.
This leads to the home country producing about the same amount and the foreign firm producing

25

less. This brings back production to the home country, which reduces the amount of leakage
from the carbon tax.
Similarly, one can consider a rebate to the home firm for carbon taxes paid on goods
exported to the foreign country. In this case, the home firm receives a subsidy, which shifts their
supply curve outward. This causes a movement along the demand curve for the good produced at
home and a subsequent price decrease. This price decrease causes buyers of the foreign good to
substitute toward the home good and shifts the foreign good demand curve inward. This causes a
movement along the supply curve, which lowers the price for the foreign good and reduces the
amount supplied. Thus, we have the same basic effect as the tariff; the home country produces
more of the polluting good and the foreign country produces less. This brings production back
under the coverage of the carbon tax and reduces leakage. A full BCA would be a combination
of these two effects, which leads to a larger reduction in carbon leakage.
So, how does this analysis change under a non-Armington model? Consider the same
setup, a bilateral model with a home and foreign firm. The big difference here is that the home
and foreign firms are small and cannot influence the world market price very much. In the
Armington model, we assume implicitly that both countries are “big” in the sense that they are
the only ones who can produce their respective goods. Any change in their respective supplies
will have strong effects on the market price of their output. In the non-Armington model, there is
one world price which is determined by the interaction of world supply and demand. The home
and foreign firms are price takers.
Figure 1.3 shows the effects of a carbon tariff and rebate for an arbitrary polluting good
in a non-Armington world. In the rightmost column, the world market shows how the world
price is determined. The left two columns are the market diagrams for the home and foreign
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firms. The home and foreign firms are price takers, so they face a perfectly horizontal demand
curve equal to the world price. To see the effect of a tariff, first look at the world market
diagram. Since there is a tax on consumption somewhere in the world, the demand curve shifts
inward. The supply curve also shifts inward, since polluting firms use polluting goods as inputs,
and taxes on these goods have increased. The quantity supplied falls and the world price stays
roughly the same. The actual effect on price is ambiguous, but I have drawn the picture to end up
with an increase in the world price, which corresponds to my results from the numerical
simulation presented later. The foreign firm sees an increase in the world price and moves along
the supply curve to produce a little bit more. The home firm also sees this increase in the world
price, but their supply curve also shifts left due to the tariff on their inputs. The result is a
decrease in production for the home country and an increase in production for the foreign
country. This leads to increased carbon leakage since less of the world production of the
polluting good is covered by home’s carbon tax.
This is a stark difference from the Armington model. The primary reason for this
difference is that the home country cannot separately influence the foreign firm’s price. This
point was first made in a seminal paper on optimal tariffs by Markusen (1975). Since both firms
receive the same world price, the supply shift in the home country dominates and leakage
increases. Since buyers do not have preferences over the origin of goods, the foreign firm does
not have to lower their price to encourage other buyers to purchase their goods. If the home
country will not buy the foreign good at the world price, somebody else will. This means that the
burden of the tariff falls primarily on the home country and the export supply curve is perfectly
elastic. Some trade economists may argue that this analysis might hold for small countries, but
not for big countries like the US. However, recent empirical studies of US tariffs on Chinese
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imports show this is indeed the case. Import tariffs imposed by the US were not able to push
down Chinese output prices, and the entirety of the tax incidence was borne by US buyers
(Cavallo et. al. 2019, Amiti et. al. 2020, Fajgelbaum et. al. 2020, Flaaen et. al. 2020).
Finally, I also look at the effect of a carbon rebate in a non-Armington world in the
bottom panels of Figure 1.3. Again, starting with the world market, the world supply curve shifts
out due to the subsidy the home firm receives on its exports. This causes a movement along the
world market demand curve and quantity supplied increases and the world price falls. The new
lower price causes a movement along the foreign firm’s supply curve, and they begin to produce
less. The home firm also sees this price decrease, but they are receiving the subsidy, so their
supply curve shifts out. This leads to more production in the home country, which is covered by
a carbon tax. Thus, a rebate may be able to reduce leakage in a non-Armington model. A full
BCA would likely include both policies, and the effect is some combination of the two
competing forces. These simple diagrams show the intuition of the model, but to put numbers on
these effects I now turn to numerical simulation.

1.3 Data and Calibration
I calibrate the model using data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), which
includes environmental satellite accounts1. The WIOD contains data on 35 industries across 40
countries and creates a balanced world representative input-output matrix. I only need one year
of data, so I use 2011, which is the most recent year available in the 2013 release. I aggregate the
database to 15 industries and 5 regions, listed in Table 1.1. I combine the members of the
European Union to create the Europe region, and I combine Canada and Mexico to form the
1

Dataset may be downloaded from www.wiod.org.

28

North America region. China and the United States are each their own regions, and all other
countries are combined into the "Rest of the World" region. The Rest of the World region
accounts for about half of global emissions, whereas China, Europe, North America, and the
United States account for the other half.
In the baseline data, fossil fuels are aggregated together in a single mining and resource
extraction industry. I use the more detailed make-and-use tables from the WIOD database to split
out fossil fuel extraction industries. This allows me to disaggregate coal, oil, and natural gas
extraction from the mining industry. However, natural gas and crude oil are still aggregated in an
"oil and gas" industry. I disaggregate this industry using energy use satellite accounts, which
report detailed energy input use by region and industry. This leaves me with three fossil fuel
industries: coal, crude oil, and natural gas.
The WIOD also produces data on emissions by fuel source, which allows me to assign
emissions content to different fuel types in my model. Crude oil, however, is used first as an
input to the petroleum refining industry, which produces usable liquid fuels such as gasoline,
diesel, and jet fuel. The WIOD does not report any emissions for crude oil but instead shows
emissions from these downstream refined products. Since the data is structured in this way, it
makes more sense to tie emissions from petroleum to the use of refined petroleum products
rather than crude oil. This gives three fuel sources for CO2 emissions: coal, natural gas, and
refined petroleum. More information on how I aggregated regions and disaggregated industries is
discussed in Appendix A.
To calibrate the model, I need to set elasticity parameters in the production functions to match
estimates from the literature. After setting the elasticity parameters, I assume prices in the initial
equilibrium are equal to unity, and I solve for the remaining parameters such that the base case
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equilibrium is equal to data in the WIOD. The parameters needed for the model and
corresponding values are listed in Table 1.2. All elasticity values come from the literature except
the sector elasticity in equation 7 and the transportation elasticity in equation 2. Instead, I
estimate both those elasticities using data from WIOD in the next section. The materials nest and
intermediate nest elasticities are set at 0.97 and 0.88, respectively, which comes from Van der
Werf (2008). The fuel nest has three papers with similar structures, so I take a central value
across those studies and get a value of 1.07 (Xie and Hawkes 2015, Khalid and Jalil 2019; Smyth,
Narayan, and Shi 2012). Consumption is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, so parameters for the

utility function are consumption shares reported in the WIOD. To calibrate the labor-leisure
choice in equation 6, I match the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to estimates from the literature.
This is an elasticity commonly estimated, which I set at 0.5 based on a survey of estimates from
Chetty et. al. (2011). Two sets of parameters go into equation 8, which predicts trade flows. The
first parameter 𝜃1𝑗 is a trade cost elasticity. The estimate of this parameter comes from Hertel et.
al. (2007), which estimates trade elasticities using border costs such as tariffs. These elasticities
are presented in appendix Table A.5. The second parameter in the trade equation is 𝜽2𝑗 , which is
a matrix of parameters calibrated so that trade flows in the baseline equilibrium match those in
the WIOD.
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Table 1.2: Parameter Values and Sources
Parameters

Value Source

Production:
Fossil fuel elasticity
Fossil fuel scale and share
Intermediate elasticity
Intermediate scale and share
Materials elasticity
Materials scale and share
Final product scale and share

𝜎𝑓𝑓

1.07

𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 , 𝛼𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑠 , 𝛼𝑜𝑖𝑙 , 𝛾𝑓𝑓 *
0.88
𝜎𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝛼𝑓𝑓 , 𝛼𝑛 , 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑡
*
0.97
𝜎𝑚𝑎𝑡
𝛼𝑓𝑓 , 𝛼𝑛 , 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑡
*
𝜔, 𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
*

Xie and Hawkes, 2015; Khalid and
Jalil, 2019; Smyth, Narayan, and
Shi, 2012
Calibrated from WIOD
Van der Werf, 2008
WIOD
Van der Werf, 2008
WIOD
WIOD

Household:
Sector elasticity
Sector constant
Consumption shares
Labor elasticity

𝜑
Φ
𝜓
𝜈

1.22
*
*
0.5

Estimated in paper from WIOD
WIOD
Income shares from WIOD
Chetty et. al. (2011)

Trade:
Trade elasticity
Trade constant
Transportation elasticity

𝜃1
𝜃2
𝜂

**
*
0.17

Hertel et. al. (2007)
Calibrated from WIOD
Estimated in paper

Emissions:
Carbon coefficient

𝑐𝑐

***

Calibrated from WIOD

Notes: This table shows all parameter value choices and sources. An entry of "varies" indicates
that the value varies over industry and region, making it unrealistic to report here. Values taken
from the literature are presented and the sources of those values in the literature are also
indicated.
* These parameters are calculated for each industry and region, so there are too many to express
here. I detail how the data from the WIOD is used with the chosen elasticity values to calibrate
the model in appendix A.
** Table A.5 in appendix shows trade elasticities used for each industry.
*** Table A.6 in appendix shows carbon coefficients for all regions and fuel types.
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1.3.a Estimation of Transportation and Sector Elasticities
I parameterize equation 2 by using regression analysis. The transportation
elasticity in equation 2 is the elasticity between distance and transportation cost. This can be
estimated in my data using the following regression equation:
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

ln(𝑠𝑛𝑡 ) = 𝛽1 ln(𝑑𝑛𝑡 ) + 𝜷2𝑛 + 𝜷3𝑗 + 𝜖𝑛𝑡

(17)

𝑁
𝑗
𝑑𝑛𝑡

𝑗

= ∑ 𝐷𝑧𝑛 × 𝐹𝑧𝑛
𝑧=1

The outcome variable in equation 17 is the share of international trade costs in the transportation
composite. The WIOD contains information on international trade costs for each industry for the
years 1995 through 2011. I divide this by the total amount spent on transportation services to
𝑗

generate 𝑠𝑛𝑡 . The explanatory variable in equation 17 is the average distance traveled by a unit of
𝑗

output. This is calculated the same way as in equation 2. The trade flows 𝐹𝑧𝑛 come from the
WIOD and distance between countries, 𝐷𝑧𝑛 , is calculated using the geosphere2 package from the
statistical language R. The last two coefficients, 𝜷2𝑛 and 𝜷3𝑗 , are vectors of region and
commodity fixed effects, respectively.
The regression results are presented in Table 1.3. The coefficient of interest is in the top
row. The columns differ by which fixed effects are included, but all specifications give the
expected sign and are statistically significant. The elasticity estimates are between the range of
0.17 and 0.55, which is close to a previous estimate of this elasticity, 0.26 (Novy 2013). I use the
lowest estimate with both region and commodity fixed effects, 0.17, as my baseline
specification, but I investigate the full range of estimated elasticities in my robustness checks.
2

The R programming language has a repository available at www.cran.r-project.org, which can be accessed to
obtain the geosphere package. Distance is measured as the miles between the center of two countries.
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Table 1.3: Regression Results for Transportation Elasticity
𝑗

0.52***
(0.0363)

log(𝑠𝑛 )
0.56***
0.26***
(0.0388)
(0.0344)

0.17***
(0.0407)

Region FE

No

Yes

No

Yes

Industry FE

No

No

Yes

Yes

R2

0.136

0.166

0.675

0.726

Coefficient
β1

Obs. = 1,296; *** = significance at the <1% level; standard errors in parentheses
Notes: These are the estimates for the coefficients in equation 13. The explanatory variable is the
average distance a good is shipped, and the dependent variable is international trade costs. The
top row is the elasticity between distance and trade costs. Region and industry FE indicate
whether fixed effects were included in the regression.

I also estimate the sector elasticity, which determines how labor is distributed across
industries based on wages since this is not commonly reported in labor economics. To do this, I
use income accounts from WIOD to construct a database of hourly earnings and employment
shares by industry3. However, a simple regression between earnings and employment indicates a
negative relationship. This is would indicate that workers move to industries with lower relative
wages. This is because I only observe equilibrium outcomes, which is determined by both supply
and demand curves. So, OLS will not be able to estimate the effect of relative wages on labor
supply. This is due to the engogeneity of prices and quantities being simultaneously determined
in a market (Manski 1993). To identify the supply curve, I use a simultaneous equations model
(SEM). The structure of the equations in the model is:
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦: log(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟 ) = 𝑏10 + 𝑏11 log(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑟 ) + 𝜖1
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑: log(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟 ) = 𝑏20 + 𝑏21 log(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑟 ) + 𝐵𝑋 + 𝜖2
3

This uses the supplemental files of Socio Economic Accounts
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Where 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟 and 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑟 are the employment shares and wages of industry 𝑖 in region
𝑟. These two variables are the same in both equations, which reflects the simultaneous nature of
the market price and quantity. The first equation is the labor supply curve, and the second is
labor demand curve. The second equation includes a vector of indices for capital inputs,
intermediate inputs, value-added inputs, and the quantity of output. Identification in SEM
requires that there is at least one variable in the demand equation that does not appear in the
supply equation (Wooldridge 2010). The vector of indices in the second equation affects the
demand for labor, but I assume that they do not affect labor supply. This allows me to use this
vector of demand-side variables as a valid instrument for wage in the labor supply equation.
I estimate this model using two-stage least squares (2SLS) and present the results from
the second stage in Table 1.4. I show four specifications, increasing the number of instruments
for each column from left to right. In the full specification, I use all four instruments, which
means the system is over-identified. I get the lowest estimate when including all demand-side
shifters as instruments. This estimate also has the best first stage fit, so I use 1.22 as my baseline
estimate for the sector elasticity. This indicates that a 10% increase in the industry wage leads to
a 12% increase in the share of labor supplied to that industry.
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Table 1.4: Regression Results for Sector Elasticity

log (𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒)

1.95***
(0.171)

log (𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
1.35***
1.36***
(.087)
(0.092)

1.22***
(0.075)

Instruments:
Value-Added

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Intermediate

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Output

No

No

Yes

Yes

Capital

No
No
No
Yes
Obs. = 6,929; *** = significance at the <1% level; standard errors in parentheses
Notes: These are the results from a two-stage least squares estimate of a simultaneous equations
model. The first stage regresses wages on a subset of the four supply side instruments. The
second stage, presented here, estimates the labor supply response to a wage change.

1.4 Results from Policy Simulations
The first scenario I consider is a carbon tax on three fuels: coal, natural gas, and refined
petroleum4. This fee is a per-unit tax on fuel, defined in equation 13, that is charged based on the
tons of carbon dioxide that are emitted upon consuming (i.e., burning) the fuel. I simulate a $50
tax per ton of CO2 in the US. I then consider three types of border adjustment policies: a tariff
only, an export rebate only, and a full BCA which includes both a tariff and an export rebate.
Which goods to apply the tariffs and rebates to is an open question fraught with debate.
However, the consensus seems to be carbon intensive and trade exposed (CITE) goods. I choose
four industries that match these criteria: mining, goods manufacturing, chemicals manufacturing,
and other manufacturing. Tariff and rebate rates are determined using data on emissions intensity
by region and industry. Tariffs are calculated such that the price of the good is increased by how

4

In emission satellite accounts from the WIOD, very few emissions result from refining crude petroleum, rather
most of the emissions occur when the refined petroleum is consumed (burned). For this reason, using refined
petroleum rather than crude oil gives a better match to global emissions.
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much the foreign country would have spent on a carbon tax given their technology and emissions
intensity. The rebate is based on how much home firms spend on the carbon tax for inputs.
I present the impacts from these policies on emissions in Table 1.5. The first column
presents the results from a $50 carbon tax in the US without any border adjustments. The first
row shows the total abatement by the US, which was 3.8% of world emissions. The second row
is the leakage in emissions outside the US, 1.1% of world emissions. Adding these two rows
gives the net world abatement of 2.7%. Dividing the leakage by gross abatement calculates the
leakage rate, which can be compared to previous studies. My non-Armington model calculates a
leakage rate of almost 30%, which is more than twice as high as the 12% average leakage rate
reported by the EMF survey of CGE models (Böhringer et. al. 2012). The only other paper that
explores the effect of the Armington model finds similar results. Balistreri et al. find that leakage
rates are 15.7% using the Armington model and 26.5% using a non-Armington model.
These results are both expected and puzzling. On the one hand, carbon leakage would
likely be higher in a non-Armington model due to highly elastic export supply curves. On the
other hand, there is little empirical evidence of carbon leakage. The European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme (ETS) had no effect on imports of cement and steel (Branger, Quirion, and
Chevallier 2016), and, despite increasing environmental stringency, the US has not experienced
carbon leakage in its manufacturing sectors (Brunel and Levinson 2021). This is puzzling since
the previous trade literature has suggested that the Armington assumption generates changes in
trade volumes that are too small (discussed in chapter 2). However, the carbon leakage literature
suggests it generates changes that are too big. This could be due to my model not including
enough frictions in the international capital market, which would limit offshoring of production.
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Specifying a model of offshoring and international capital movements is beyond the scope of this
paper, but this puzzle is an interesting avenue for future research.

Table 1.5: Summary of Impact from $50/ton CO2 Carbon Tax in United States

Carbon Tax
Emissions:
Gross Abatement
+
Leakage
=
Net Abatement

Border Adjustment Policies
Tariff
Rebate

BCA

-3.81%

-3.83%

-3.76%

-3.79%

1.13%

1.20%

0.94%

1.03%

-2.68%

-2.63%

-2.82%

-2.76%

29.6%

31.4%

25.1%

27.1%

Economic Variables:
Aggregate Labor

-0.63%

-0.69%

-0.58%

-0.64%

Aggregate Wage

-1.67%

-1.83%

-1.47%

-1.64%

Leakage Rate

Real GDP
-0.62%
-0.66%
-0.59%
-0.62%
Notes: This table shows carbon leakage under different carbon price policies. The first four rows
show data on emissions and leakage. The first row is the gross abatement as a percent of world
emissions by the United States. The second row shows the amount of leakage as a percent of
world emissions, and the third row is the summation of row 1 and 2. The leakage rate is simply
the negative of the second row divided by the first. Economic variables are expressed as percent
changes from the baseline business-as-usual scenario.

Returning to the results in Table 1.5, columns two through four show leakage and
economic impacts when including different border adjustment policies. The second column is the
impact of a carbon tax with a tariff on carbon intensive inputs. As predicted in section 1.2.g, the
tariff alone does not decrease carbon leakage. The supply shock in the home country dominates
and carbon leakage increases to 31.4%. The US also sees more detrimental outcomes in
economic variables. Compared to the scenario with only a carbon tax, aggregate labor supply
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falls by 0.06 percentage points more, the aggregate wage falls by 0.15 percentage points more,
and real GDP falls by 0.04 percentage points more.
Under a rebate only border adjustment, I do find leakage decreases to 25.1%, which is a
15% reduction in leakage. Gross abatement (abatement by the US) is smaller than in the carbon
tax only scenario. This is because the rebate increases US production of polluting goods to bring
more production under the coverage of the carbon tax. However, leakage falls enough such that
net abatement is higher. Economic conditions are also better under this policy, which is partly
due to production being brought back to the US and partly due to the burden of the carbon tax
being smaller, since the government is subsidizing polluting firms. Compared to scenario with
only a carbon tax, aggregate labor supply is 0.06 percentage points higher, the aggregate wage is
0.2 percentage points higher, and real GDP is 0.03 percentage points higher.
The full BCA policy is a tariff and rebate combined. The results are presented in the final
column of Table 1.5. Carbon leakage decreases to 27.1%, which is an 8.6% reduction from the
carbon tax only scenario. This number is a far cry from traditional Armington models that predict
BCAs can reduce carbon leakage by about 30%. This difference is driven mainly by the fact that
the tariff effect in this model increases carbon leakage, so the rebate is competing with the tariff.
Economic outcomes are surprisingly similar to the carbon tax only scenario. Aggregate labor
supply is slightly lower, the aggregate wage is slightly higher, and there is no discernable effect
on GDP.
So, while a BCA policy does seem to reduce leakage without much harm to the economy,
the predicted reduction is much smaller in this model. While the effect from the rebate can help
reduce leakage by encouraging more production in the taxed region, the tariff effect works
against the rebate. A rebate only policy may be preferable for leakage concerns, however it can
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be costly. A full BCA policy pays for itself in government revenue. In my simulation a carbon
tariff raises about $19 billion in revenue and the rebate costs about $15 billion, which is a net
gain to the US treasury. Revenues from the carbon tax are $170 billion, so a rebate only policy
would reduce carbon tax revenue by 9%. The question for policymakers is whether this revenue
loss is worth the 15% reduction in leakage rates.
Aggregate labor market effects can be decomposed by industry as well, since carbon
taxes disproportionately affect fossil fuel and manufacturing industries. Figure 1.4 shows two
graphs breaking down labor market effects by industry. The top graph shows how the aggregate
labor supply loss is distributed across industries. Under a carbon tax without border protections,
CITE industries have the largest employment losses followed by fossil fuel industries and then
service industries. Since CITE industries have very high exposure to the carbon tax, workers
leave those industries and enter service industries which are relatively insulated from the tax.
Including a tariff without a rebate leads to an even higher transfer of workers from CITE
industries to services, again due to the supply shock for these firms.
Interestingly, including a rebate switches this pattern. Services become the biggest losers,
and CITE industries have a much smaller labor decline. While a full BCA may not increase
aggregate employment very much, it does seem to redistribute the burden of the tax on labor to
the service sector. The bottom panel of Figure 1.4 shows how labor losses are distributed within
the service sectors (transportation and agriculture are excluded). A tariff gives a small
employment increase to business, consumer, and social services. These industries hold large
shares of the aggregate labor supply and, thus, they pull in workers fleeing the CITE industries
due to the tariff. A rebate for CITE industries means fewer workers leave those industries, so
they see larger decreases in employment under a rebate policy. Construction, however, has a
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small share of the overall labor supply and is more exposed to the carbon tax since they often use
emission intensive inputs. A tariff ends up causing a small decrease in construction employment.
Again, a rebate causes more workers to stay in the CITE industries, so construction is not able to
hire workers leaving those industries.

Figure 1.4: Labor Market Impacts from a $50/ton CO2 Carbon Tax in United States

Notes: This figure shows employment impacts of four different policies. From left to right: a
carbon tax without border protections, a carbon tax with a tariff on carbon intensive trade
exposed (CITE) goods, a carbon tax with an output rebate for CITE industries, and carbon tax
with a border carbon adjustment which includes both the tariff and the rebate. The top graph
shows employment effects for three large sectors of the economy and the aggregate labor supply.
The impacts are expressed in percent change of total labor supply so that the sum of the three
sectors equals the aggregate labor effect. The bottom graph performs the same exercise, but
selects four sub-sectors from the Services and Agriculture industry in the top graph.
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1.4.a Monte Carlo Simulation
In the baseline simulation, I assume that all elasticities are the same across regions. This
was because I take these estimates from the literature, and I could not find consistent estimates of
these elasticities for all regions in my dataset. To check how my results respond to different
parameterizations, I perform a Monte Carlo simulation of a $50 per ton of CO2 carbon tax in the
US with and without a BCA policy. For each elasticity parameter, I randomly select a value from
a uniform distribution from a range around the baseline parameter. I randomly draw each of the
three production elasticities: materials, intermediate, and fossil fuels, as well as the leisure
elasticity and the sector elasticity. I also randomly draw values for carbon coefficients, which
determine the amount of carbon released by different fuels. These were calculated for each
region, and the difference of these numbers between regions may be important for carbon
leakage if production moves to a region with more emission intensive technology. The ranges of
these values I either take from the range of elasticities seen in the literature, or a range that I have
estimated. More details on the process and ranges chosen are in Appendix B. Parameters are
randomized among both region and industry, so this process allows for heterogeneity along both
of those dimensions as well. After drawing a random set of elasticity parameters, the other
parameters in the model are recalibrated to match the baseline data under the new specification. I
then simulate a $50 per ton carbon tax with and without a BCA under the new calibration.
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Figure 1.5: Results from Monte Carlo Simulations

Notes: These graphs are created from 100 simulations of a $50 per ton carbon tax under four
different policies. Each graph shows the effect of each policy listed on the vertical axis. From top
to bottom the policies are: a carbon tax without border protections, a carbon tax with a tariff on
carbon intensive trade exposed (CITE) goods, a carbon tax with an output rebate for CITE
industries, and carbon tax with a border carbon adjustment which includes both the tariff and the
rebate.
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The results discussed up to this point still hold under this exercise. The results from 100
simulations are presented in Figure 1.5. Box plots are presented to show the range of outcomes
from the simulations. As expected, a tariff only policy on average predicts a 2.5 percentage point
higher leakage rate compared to a carbon tax alone. This is slightly higher than the baseline
simulation which predicted tariffs increased the leakage rate by 1.8 percentage points. The
highest increase in leakage rates across all simulations was 19%. In no simulation did a carbon
tariff reduce leakage compared to the carbon tax only policy. A rebate only policy is predicted to
lower leakage rates by 5.7 percentage points on average, which is an 18% leakage reduction. The
largest leakage reduction across all simulations was 37%. Finally, a full BCA policy reduces
leakage by 2.9 percentage points on average, which is an 8.5% reduction. The largest reduction
in leakage from a BCA policy across all simulations was 15%.
Results on economic variables show the same pattern as well. Aggregate labor supply
decreased by and average of 0.05 percentage points more under a tariff only policy compared to
a carbon tax without border protections. This goes in the other direction for a rebate. Aggregate
labor supply is 0.05 percentage points higher on average when a rebate only policy is added to a
carbon tax. Aggregate wage declines were 0.15 percentage points higher on average when
adding a tariff and 0.2 percentage points lower when adding a rebate. Real GDP declines were
0.04 percentage points larger on average when adding a tariff and 0.04 percentage points lower
when only adding a rebate. For all these variables, a BCA causes the tariff and rebate effects to
cancel out, and the effects of a BCA are not discernably different from the carbon tax without
border protections.
While this exercise shows that there can be considerable heterogeneity in the magnitudes
of the outcomes of these policies, the broad conclusions of this paper still hold. Carbon tariffs
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increase leakage, and export rebates decrease leakage. Additionally, reductions from border
carbon adjustments seem to be smaller than what has been reported by other studies. The largest
leakage reduction from a BCA I find is 15%, which is still only half the 30% average rate
predicted by previous Armington models.

1.5 Conclusion
International trade is a powerful force and important to consider when analyzing national
tax policies. CGE modeling is often employed when determining how public policy will affect
international trade. These models depend on the Armington assumption, which differentiates
goods by the origin of production. In this paper, I build a CGE model that does not rely on the
Armington assumption. This model differs from previous non-Armington CGE climate models,
in that I introduce a method for predicting trade flows. I find that carbon leakage rates are higher
using a non-Armington model. I find similar leakage rates to the only other non-Armington study
of carbon leakage, despite different datasets and largely different model structures. However, I
also find that if half of global emissions are covered, leakage rates drop to 16%.
The second result is that the typically suggested remedy, a BCA, is not as effective in
reducing leakage in a non-Armington framework. In this non-Armington framework, firms in all
regions face the same market demand curve. So, tariffs can redistribute trade flows, but they
cannot reduce the production of carbon intensive goods in untaxed regions without reducing it in
the taxed region as well. Many of the industries covered by carbon tariffs are inputs for domestic
production, which means the home country experiences a supply shock. This causes production
in the taxed region to fall and production in the untaxed region to expand, leading to higher
carbon leakage rates under a carbon tariff. This finding is robust to several parameterizations. I
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also find that tariffs lead to contractions in aggregate labor supply and GDP and a fall in the
aggregate wage.
When lawmakers are designing BCAs, it is crucial that they include an export rebate for
it to have any effect. Even then, the effects may be small. One possible avenue for future
research is determining how much effect a country can have on foreign output prices. If a
country has enough influence on the world price, it may be possible for tariffs to reduce leakage.
However, as globalization increases and countries begin trading more in intermediate goods, the
role of the Armington assumption seems to be diminishing. Policymakers should be wary of this
when enacting trade policy.
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Chapter 2: Non-Armington Application to NAFTA
2.1 Introduction
Governments have long held considerable influence over trade with the outside world, an
observation made by Adam Smith back in 1776. Since Smith’s time, international trade has
increased dramatically, relative to output, trade tripled during the last half of the 20th Century.
However, it also the nature of trade that has changed, during that same time trade in
manufacturing goods grew 50% faster than total trade (Hummels 2007). As supply chains
become more integrated, many governments have pursued more open trade policies by entering
into free trade agreements. When analyzing the effects of trade policies, modelers often use the
Armington assumption. While this model is useful for incorporating important features of
international trade, it has some weaknesses in policy analysis.
In the first chapter, I discussed how the Armington assumption changes environmental
trade policy outcomes. Two other issues arise with the Armington assumption. The first is that it
predicts small changes in trade in response to changes in trade policy. This problem arises
because parameterizing the Armington model for industries with little to no previous trade leads
to predictions of trade volumes being “stuck on zero” (Kuiper and van Tongeren 2006). In other
words, it is difficult to induce large changes in trade in policy applications. Secondly, the
Armington assumption can give a large upward bias in optimal tariff calculations in comparison
to homogeneous trade models. In response to some scenarios, the Armington assumption can
generate optimal tariff rates over 100% (He, Li, Wang, and Whalley 2017).
While this paper focuses on the first problem, the second problem is related to the issue
brought up in chapter 1, if the country has little pricing power, then a tariff may not achieve the
goals of the policymaker. However, in the past half century, many countries have pursued more
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open trade policies, often forming free trade areas without any tariffs on trade. One notable
example is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). While most research agrees
that this policy had overall positive welfare effects, the changes for individual industries were
much larger than predicted by CGE models of the time (Caliendo and Parro 2015). Some have
argued that this occurs because the Armington functional form does not effectively capture the
introduction of new products in trade (Zhai 2008). Others argue that adding preferences on the
export side may improve prediction of the Armington model (de Melo and Robinson 1989).
There are also models that adjust the Armington parameters to amplify trade changes in
industries with little trade (Kehoe, Rossbach, and Ruhl 2015).
One paper, Kehoe (2005), shows the problem of small changes directly by comparing
CGE predicted effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) against observed
data. Kehoe concludes that these CGE models were unable to generate the large changes that
were seen in data. He further suggests that a non-Armington model may be able to generate those
large changes. In this paper, I investigate this claim using a trade model that does not appeal to
the Armington assumption. Instead, I model each industry as producing a commodity that is
homogeneous across borders. I then go through an application of counterfactual analysis using
this model. I compare my results to the data in a fashion similar to Kehoe to show when the nonArmington model may be useful to researchers.
Several papers have used CGE models to analyze free trade agreements. The model
Kehoe focuses on is the Brown-Deardorff-Stern CGE model (Brown, Deardorff, and Stern
1992). This model uses a combination of the traditional Armington model and another model of
imperfect competition derived from Krugman (1979). Other authors have used a Ricardian
model derived from Eaton and Kortum (2002) to analyze the effects of NAFTA (Caliendo and
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Parro 2015, Shikher 2012). These Ricardian models find larger trade impacts than Armington
models, however they require modelers to impose a distribution of productivity across countries
for each industry. In this paper, I do not impose any distributional productivity assumptions,
which allows me to use standard input-output data that is a frequent resource used to calibrate
CGE models.
The goal of this paper is to show how desirable features of the Armington model can be
replicated in a non-Armington model. I then present a case study by applying this model to
NAFTA and comparing my results to previous CGE models. To do this I begin with a nonArmington CGE model from Feltenstein and Plassmann (2008), which allows goods to be
homogeneous by origin by imposing that labor is immobile between industries and regions. I
extend this model by allowing for imperfect mobility across sectors and including a new
algorithm that predicts trade flows. I contribute to the literature in two ways. The first is
providing an analysis of the effects of NAFTA using a CGE model where goods are
homogeneous by origin. The second is providing a tractable solution for estimating trade flows
in a homogeneous goods model.
This paper also helps improve our understanding of modern trade behavior. As trade
volume increases and costs fall, the intuition of the Armington assumption may be weakening as
well. Many final products have large international supply chains, so consumers may not even
know where their product was produced. Additionally, intermediate inputs are now a large and
still growing share of international trade, and firms can produce those inputs practically
anywhere they have the infrastructure and labor available. By modeling trade without the
Armington assumption, governments can better anticipate how policy will affect each sector in
the economy.
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2.2 CGE Models and the Armington Assumption
Modelers formalize the Armington assumption by using aggregation functions that allow
imperfect substitution between products of different origin. An aggregation function is simply a
combination of two goods to form a single composite good. Typically, this function combines
the domestic and foreign produced goods into a final composite good that is then used as final
and intermediate consumption. The specification from Armington (1969) uses a constant
elasticity of substitution form. This allows the modeler to estimate a substitution elasticity that
can be taken directly to CGE models. Armington's 1969 paper was primarily econometric and
focused on devising the algebraic underpinnings of estimating these trade elasticities.
The Armington model was a useful innovation since it could generate equilibria where
countries did not perfectly specialize. Recall that Ricardo's model of comparative advantage was
entirely frictionless and resulted in each country producing the good it could make at the lowest
opportunity cost. Since each region produces only one good, this implies trade will result in a
corner solution, i.e., perfect specialization. This innovation helped economists to estimate the
possible welfare improvements from international markets, but corner solutions are non-existent
in the real world. By adding frictions in the commodity market, one can stay away from corner
solutions. Using the Armington model, each country cannot specialize since they can only make
the type of goods they produce (England could not specialize in French cloth, only English
cloth).
In this model, I use a framework that imposes frictions on the labor market to prevent
perfect specialization. This can be done by imposing region specific labor supplies, so labor is
not perfectly mobile across sectors and regions (Feltenstein and Plassmann). I restrict labor to be
perfectly immobile between regions and sticky between industries. To have the model stay away
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from corner solutions, one needs to impose frictions in either the commodity markets or factor
markets. While the Armington model puts this friction in the commodity market, in the nonArmington model, this friction is in the factor markets. This model is the same as the model used
in Chapter 1, however the structure of production is much simpler. Instead of having 4 nests of
production, I only use two in this paper.
Another important feature of the Armington model is the ability to model cross-hauling
or two-way trade. This means that a country can import and export the same product category.
Suppose the modeler restricts factors to allow imperfect specialization so several countries
produce the same good. If foreign goods are perfectly substitutable for domestic goods, any
positive transport cost would mean that optimizing agents only buy foreign goods if they cannot
produce those goods themselves. In other words, even with imperfect specialization, perfect
substitution implies countries are either exporters or importers, but not both. The Armington
assumption allows for differentiation, which, in turn, allows countries to import and export the
“same” good. While imports and exports may be in the same product category, they are produced
in different countries, so they are treated as different products in the Armington model.
In this model, I extend current non-Armington models to include cross-hauling. While an
Armington model uses the distribution of output prices to determine trade flows, the model I
specify only creates a single world price for each commodity. Since there are no price
differentials between countries, I instead use quantity differentials to predict trade flows. Each
firm in each region sees the global price for their output and the domestic prices for inputs. Using
this information, each region determines optimal output and consumption. Given the amounts
that each region supplies and demands, I determine trade between regions using an algorithm
that predicts trade flows based on historical trade flows and tariff rates. This method makes use
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of the observation from the gravity literature that trade patterns tend to be related to economic
size and distance between countries. Countries that are bigger and closer together tend to be
stronger trade partners.
This framework provides benefits from a modeling standpoint as well. The model can be
calibrated with minimal data requirements. Trade elasticities are not needed to describe trade. In
this model, I will include trade elasticities to determine the response to explicit trade costs –
tariffs, however this is not necessary if trade costs do not change in the counterfactual.
Estimating Armington elasticities often requires timeseries data on prices and trade volumes,
which may not be available for some regions. Additionally, I do not need to estimate the
distribution of productivity across firms. I assume a representative firm in each industry, which is
a common assumption in CGE Armington models. This allows me to use widely available social
accounting matrices (SAMs) from a single baseline year to calibrate the model.

2.3 Model Description
The model description is organized into 4 parts: production, consumption, trade flows,
and government. In the model, there are 𝐽 goods produced, bought, and sold by each of the 𝑁
regions. Production is undertaken by a representative firm in industry in each region. Each region
also has a representative household that supplies labor and capital to for firms to use in
production. I assume that capital is internationally mobile, but labor is not. Labor is only
supplied to the domestic market, and it is imperfectly mobile between industries.
Goods are homogeneous by origin, so each good has a single world price. All firms
receive the world price for their output; however, importers may pay a higher price due to the
presence of tariffs. Firms use the set of world prices and the price of capital to determine the
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optimal wage for workers in their industry and region. Workers then use posted wages to choose
which industries to supply labor to. Using the distribution of labor supply and wages, I determine
total production and consumption for each region. Then, using the production and consumption
quantities for each region, I use an algorithm that builds a trade matrix based on baseline trade
flows and tariffs. The equilibrium allocation is found by iterating on the vector of world
commodity prices and the world price of capital until all goods and factor markets clear.

2.3.a Production
I use a neoclassical production function to describe production. Each firm combines
capital, labor, and intermediate goods to create a unit of final output. I specify a Cobb-Douglas
production function as follows:
𝑎

𝑏

𝑐

𝑠
𝑄𝑗𝑟
= 𝐹𝑗𝑟 (𝐾𝑗𝑟 , 𝐿𝑗𝑟 , 𝑀𝑗𝑟 ) = 𝛾𝑗𝑟 𝐾𝑗𝑟𝑗𝑟 𝐿𝑗𝑟𝑗𝑟 𝑀𝑗𝑟𝑗𝑟

𝑀𝑗𝑟 =

𝜎
𝐽
𝜎−1
𝜎
𝜎−1
𝑖 𝑖
𝜎−1
(∑(𝜌𝑗𝑟
𝛾𝑗𝑟
𝑥𝑗𝑟 ) 𝜎 )
𝑖=1

(1)

(2)

𝐾𝑗𝑟 , 𝐿𝑗𝑟 , and 𝑀𝑗𝑟 are capital input, labor input, and an intermediate composite input, respectively,
for the firm that produces good 𝑗 in region 𝑟. Each firm’s intermediate composite is a
combination of the 𝐽 input commodities sold on the world market. 𝑀𝑗𝑟 is a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) combination of intermediate commodity inputs, where the amount of
𝑖
commodity 𝑖 used by firm 𝑗 in region 𝑟 is 𝑥𝑗𝑟
. The composite is defined in equation 2. The

parameter 𝜎 is a substitution elasticity between inputs in the intermediate composite. The
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𝑖
parameters 𝛾 and 𝜌𝑗𝑟
are the CES scale and share parameters, respectively. The production

function exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) so 𝑎𝑗𝑟 + 𝑏𝑗𝑟 + 𝑐𝑗𝑟 = 1 ∀ 𝑗, 𝑟. I assume a zeroprofit condition, so cost must equal revenues, or
𝑠
𝑃𝑗 𝑄𝑗𝑟
= 𝑃𝐾 𝐾𝑗𝑟 + 𝑤𝑗𝑟 𝐿𝑗𝑟 + 𝑃𝑗𝑟𝑀 𝑀𝑗𝑟

Here, 𝑃𝑗 is the price of output for the firm, 𝑃𝐾 is the world price for capital, 𝑤𝑗𝑟 is the wage rate,
and 𝑃𝑗𝑟𝑀 is the intermediate composite price, in industry 𝑗 and region 𝑟. The price of the
intermediate composite is calculated using optimal demands and input prices for each
intermediate commodity.
Setting up the cost minimization problem and taking first order conditions gives the
following demand equations:

𝑖 ∗
𝑥𝑗𝑟

=

𝐾𝑗𝑟∗ =

𝑎𝑗𝑟
𝑃 𝑄𝑠
𝑃𝐾 𝑗 𝑗𝑟

(3)

∗
𝐿𝑗𝑟
=

𝑏𝑗𝑟
𝑠
𝑃𝑗 𝑄𝑗𝑟
𝑤𝑗𝑟

(4)

𝑀𝑗∗ =

𝑐𝑗𝑟
𝑃 𝑄𝑠
𝑃𝑗𝑟𝑀 𝑗 𝑗𝑟

(5)

𝜎 𝐷
𝜌𝑗𝑟
𝑃𝑗𝑟
𝜎
1−𝜎
𝛾𝑟𝑗

−𝜎

𝜎
−
1−𝜎
𝐽
𝑖 −𝜎 𝐷 1−𝜎
(∑𝑖=1 𝜌𝑟𝑗 𝑃𝑟𝑗 )

𝑀𝑗∗

(6)

Equations 3-6 define optimal demands for each firm 𝑗 in region 𝑟. The variable 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝐷 is the
domestic price buyers pay for good 𝑖. Note this can differ from the output price, 𝑃𝑗 , due to tariffs.
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2.3.b Household
Each region has a representative household that makes income from supplying capital
and labor to firms as well as a government transfer. They then spend this income on final goods
and services produced by firms. I assume that labor is internationally immobile and that it is
sticky between industries. This is necessary for a fully non-Armington model to prevent perfect
specialization. If employees could move between industries freely, all workers would simply
move into the industry that paid the highest wages, and the country would completely specialize.
Since we do not observe perfect specialization, I assume that workers have preferences over
which industries they work in. The household problem is:
𝐽

max 𝑈𝑟 (𝐶1𝑟 , … , 𝐶𝐽𝑟 ) = ∏(𝐶𝑖𝑟 )𝜃𝑖𝑟
𝐶𝑖𝑟

(7)

𝑖=1

𝑠. 𝑡.
𝐽

∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝐷 𝐶𝑖𝑟 = 𝑤
̅𝑟 𝐿̅𝑟 + 𝑃𝐾 𝐾𝑟 + Tr
𝑖=1

The consumer maximizes a utility function that is a Cobb-Douglas consumption function of
goods from each industry 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐽. The parameter 𝜃𝑖𝑟 is the income share for good 𝑖 in region
𝑟. The household earns price 𝑃𝐾 on capital supplied, 𝐾𝑟 , and an aggregate wage, 𝑤
̅𝑟 , on total
labor supplied, 𝐿̅𝑟 . In addition, households in each region receive a lump-sum transfer from the
government, T𝑟 . Shares of labor supplied to each industry are determined by the following
exponential share equation.
𝑙𝑟𝑗 =

exp(𝜂1 ln (𝑤𝑟𝑗 ) + 𝜂2𝑟𝑗 )
𝐽
∑𝑖=1 exp(𝜂1 ln (𝑤𝑟𝑖 ) + 𝜂2𝑟𝑖 )
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(8)

𝐽

𝑤
̅𝑟 = ∑ 𝑤𝑟𝑗 𝑙𝑟𝑗

𝑎𝑛𝑑

𝐿𝑠𝑟𝑗 = 𝑙𝑟𝑗 × 𝐿̅𝑟 ∀

𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽

𝑗=1

Equation 8 is a reduced-form labor supply equation. This function takes in two parameters. The
first parameter is 𝜂1 , which is the elasticity of sector labor supply, 𝐿𝑠𝑟𝑗 , with respect to the
sectoral wage, 𝑤𝑟𝑗 . The sectoral wage is determined in the production step using optimal
demands given a set of world output prices and the world price of capital. After determining the
sectoral wage from the firm’s problem, households determine labor supplies to each industry.
At this point, I have created a world Arrow-Debreu economy that can be solved to find
consumption and production in each industry and region. Consumption quantities come from
solving for intermediate demands in the production step and consumption demands from the
household. The sum of these is the total quantity of goods demanded by the region. Production
quantities can be found using the optimal labor supplies to each sector from equation 8, and
firms’ optimal demand for labor from equation 4. In the next section, I use these quantities of
production and consumption as inputs to an algorithm that estimates trade flows among the
regions in the model.

2.3.c Trade Flows
Goods in this model are homogeneous by origin. Each good has a world market price,
and firms in all regions receive the world market price. When consumers and firms purchase
goods, they pay the world price plus any mark-up from tariffs. The problem with this model
framework is that regions have no incentive to engage in cross-hauling. This is the act of a region
importing and exporting the same good. Since this is a well-documented feature of international
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trade, I implement a new algorithm to predict trade flows between regions that incorporates this
feature. I refer to the algorithm as a “gravity” model as it uses the observation from the gravity
literature to predict trade flows. The gravity literature argues that trade integration between two
countries tends to be correlated with their respective economic sizes and the distance between
them (Deardorff 1998).
To set up the model, I assume that the modeler has information on total consumption and
production for each region, but not information on price differentials. I assume that for each
𝑗

industry output 𝑗, a buyer in region 𝑟 will meet a seller from region 𝑧 with probability 𝑎𝑟𝑧 . In
practice, this parameter is simply the share of imports from region 𝑧 in total consumption for
region 𝑟. I use this probability to create a matrix of estimated trade flows. I estimate the trade
flow between regions 𝑟 and 𝑧 by multiplying the probability that region 𝑟 is a buyer and the
probability that 𝑟 meets 𝑧.
𝑗
𝑗
𝐹̂𝑟𝑧 = 𝐷 𝑗 (𝑛) × 𝑎𝑟𝑧

𝑅
𝑗

∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑧 = 1
𝑧=1

The function 𝐷 𝑗 (𝑛) is simply the share of world consumption of good 𝑗 that region 𝑟 buys. Here,
𝑗
𝐹̂𝑟𝑧 represents the probability that a given unit of total world production of commodity 𝑗 is

exported from origin region 𝑟 as an import to destination region 𝑧. This gives the estimated trade
flow matrix:
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𝑗
𝐹̂11
𝑻𝑗 = ( ⋮
𝑗
𝐹̂𝑅1

𝑗
⋯ 𝐹̂1𝑅
⋱
⋮ )
𝑗
̂
⋯ 𝐹𝑅𝑅

The rows of this matrix represent demand, and the columns represent supply. Thus, the imports
from region 1 to region 2 can be found by looking at column 1 and row 2. The matrix also
𝑗

represents intraregional trade. Entries along the diagonal, 𝐹̂𝑟𝑟 , are the amounts that region 𝑟
consumes of its own production. To find the total estimated trade flows, one can simply multiply
the matrix by total world consumption (or production) of good 𝑗. When calculating trade flows in
a new equilibrium, I use the market-clearing amounts of consumption by region, and the
probability of meeting is exogenously specified from a baseline of trade flows. For this matrix to
be balanced, the rows must sum to the shares of world consumption, and the columns must sum
to world production:
𝑅
𝑗

∑ 𝐹̂𝑟𝑧 = 𝐷 𝑗 (𝑛)
𝑧=1

(9)

𝑅
𝑗

∑ 𝐹̂𝑟𝑧 = 𝑆𝑗 (𝑧)
𝑛=1

(10)

Here, 𝑆𝑗 (𝑧) is the share of the world quantity of commodity 𝑗 that region 𝑧 produces. Since the
probabilities I used to create the trade matrix sum to unity, the sum of row 𝑟 of 𝑻𝒋 is equal to
𝐷 𝑗 (𝑟), and the sum of regional demand equals total demand by construction. Supply, however,
may not equal demand. Thus, equation 9 holds, but equation 10 may not. If equation 10 does not
hold, then it is not a feasible allocation, and I need to adjust my estimate of trade flows to create
a new matrix.
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To redistribute trade flows and balance the trade matrix, I use an iterative method. When
describing the sequential steps of the algorithm, I use a super script to denote which iteration the
𝑗(𝑞)
algorithm is on. For example, 𝐹̂𝑟𝑧 is the trade flow calculated on iteration 𝑞. To begin the

algorithm, I take my initial transportation matrix and define a vector of excess demands. This is
the sum of trade flows in column 𝑧 minus the production share in region 𝑧 given by the CGE
model.
𝑁

𝜓

𝑗(𝑞) (𝑧)

𝑗(𝑞)

= ∑ 𝐹̂𝑟𝑧

− 𝑆𝑗 (𝑧)

𝑧=1

Excess demand for goods from region 𝑧 is represented by 𝜓 𝑗(𝑞) (𝑧), and is the amount the trade
flows matrix is overstating production in region 𝑧. In other words, region 𝑧 does not produce
enough to satisfy the trade flows estimated by the trade flows matrix in step 𝑞. Due to the
construction of the matrix, the sum of excess demands is equal to zero at every step. This means
that elements of excess production can be either positive or negative. For the matrix to be
balanced and equation 10 hold, each element of excess production must be zero. To achieve this,
I use a two-step updating process to redistribute trade flows. In the first step, I find the column
with the largest positive excess production and update each element in the column by reducing it
proportionally to trade flows calculated in the current iteration. The new column that replaces
this column is calculated using the following formula.

𝑗(𝑞+1)
𝑗(𝑞)
𝐹̂𝑟𝑧
= 𝐹̂𝑟𝑧 − 𝜓 𝑗(𝑞) (𝑧)

𝑗(𝑞)
𝐹̂𝑟𝑧
∑𝑅𝑖=1 𝐹̂ 𝑗(𝑞)
𝑖𝑧

(11)

This recursive equation updates the trade flow matrix column elements. On the right-hand side,
the first term is the trade flow I calculated in the current iteration. The second term subtracts the
excess demands from the region proportional to trade flows in the current iteration. For example,
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suppose 10% of production from region 1 went to region 2 according to the current trade matrix.
If region 1 has positive excess demands, then I subtract 10% of excess demand for region 1 from
𝑗
the trade flows from region 1 to region 2, 𝐹̂12 .

The reduction of the excess demands in the first step means that some regions shift their
consumption to other regions. Thus, I need to increase consumption of other regions such that
regional demand still sums to total demand (equation 9). This is done in the second step by
updating the row elements in the transportation matrix.

𝑗(𝑞+1)
𝑗(𝑞)
𝐹̂𝑟𝑧
= 𝐹̂𝑟𝑧 + 𝑃𝑗 (𝑟, 𝑧; 𝜓 𝑗(𝑞) (𝑧) < 0) (𝜓 𝑗(𝑞) (𝑧)

𝑗(𝑞)
𝐹̂𝑟𝑧
)
∑𝑅𝑖=1 𝐹̂ 𝑗(𝑞)

(12)

𝑖𝑧

This recursive equation updates the trade flow matrix row elements of the columns that were not
replaced by equation 11. The second term on the right-hand side is the mirror to the equation that
updates the columns. The first part of the second term is the probability that region r will meet a
buyer from region 𝑧 given that region 𝑧 has negative excess demands. This can be calculated
using the trade matrix in the current iteration.

𝑗

𝑃 (𝑟, 𝑧; 𝜓

𝑗(𝑞) (𝑧)

𝑗(𝑞)
𝐹̂𝑟𝑧
< 0) =
, 𝑖 ∈ {𝜓 𝑗(𝑞) (𝑧) < 0}
𝑗(𝑞)
∑𝑖 𝐹̂
𝑟𝑖

This adjustment increases demands for regions that have negative excess demands, or demand
that is less than their current production. The function increases quantity demanded from each
other region proportionally to how much that region demands from regions that are
overproducing. For example, suppose region 1 is the column adjusted using equation 11, which
reduces the demand for goods from region 1. Suppose further that demand in region 2 for goods
from region 1 is reduced by 1 unit due to this adjustment. If both region 2 and region 3 have
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negative excess demands, I shift this extra demand from region 2 to regions 2 and 3. If region 2
accounts for 90% of the demand from region 2 for output from regions 2 and 3, 0.9 units are
shifted to region 2 and 0.1 units are shifted to region 3.
The last issue to confront here is how to incorporate explicit trade costs. This is an
important question for this model because I am using it to determine the effect of changing tariff
𝑗

rates. I model the effect of trade costs by modeling the estimate of 𝛼𝑟𝑧 as a function of a baseline
constant and tariffs.
𝑗

𝑗
𝛼𝑟𝑧

=

𝑗

𝑗

exp(𝑙𝑛(𝐵𝑟𝑧 ) − 𝜔 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝜏𝑟𝑧 − 𝜏̂ 𝑟𝑧 ))
𝑗
𝑗
∑𝑅𝑖=1 exp(𝑙𝑛(𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑗 ) − 𝜔 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝜏𝑟𝑖
− 𝜏̂ 𝑟𝑖 ))

(13)

This is the exponential share function again. The denominator is the sum of the elements in
𝑗

𝑗

numerator to normalize 𝛼𝑟𝑧 into a ratio. The parameter 𝐵𝑟𝑧 is the baseline share of consumption
in region 𝑟 that comes from region 𝑧. The second term in the exponential in the numerator is log
𝑗

of one plus the difference between tariff rates in the counterfactual 𝜏𝑟𝑧 and tariff rates in the base
𝑗

case, 𝜏𝑟𝑧 . This is then multiplied by a trade cost elasticity 𝜔. If tariff rates in the counterfactual
𝑗

fall, then the 𝛼𝑟𝑧 will increase, indicating that buyers in region 𝑟 are more likely to meet sellers
from region 𝑧.
The algorithm terminates in a fixed number of steps, 𝑅 − 1. This allows it to be
implemented in a CGE model without fear of slowing down computational time. Additionally,
𝑗

the only parameters needed are baseline production quantities and trade flows to calculate 𝛼𝑟𝑧 ,
which can be done given information on all production and trade flows. The other necessary
parameter is 𝜔, which has several estimates in the literature. However, this parameter is only
needed if one is modeling trade costs explicitly, such as tariffs.
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2.3.d Comparison of Trade Models
The gravity algorithm generates empirically observed trade patterns using the distribution
of supply and demand across regions. An example trade matrix for three regions is shown in the
first panel of Table 2.1. Along the bottom row is the sum of the columns, which is the total share
of world production for each region. Along the right-hand column are the sums of the rows,
which are the total shares of world demand for each region. The elements of the matrix are the
trade flows between regions. The question for the modeler is: given a new set of shares of world
demand and supply, how do you estimate the elements of the matrix?
The following three panels in Table 2.1 show possible transportation matrices given a
new distribution of supply and demand shares. In this case, I have simply flipped these vectors.
The first panel shows the baseline matrix, which is the trade flows and total production and
consumption in the baseline dataset. The following panels shows three different ways of
estimating the trade flows (interior elements) using the supply and demand shares (row and
column totals). The second panel shows the result from a net trade model. This means that there
is no cross-hauling, and regions only engage in net trade. In this case, region 1 is the only net
exporter, so region 1 satisfies all domestic demand and then exports any excess production.
Regions 2 and 3 are net importers, so they export nothing to other industries and import the
excess production from region 1. The net trade model is typically used by small open economy
models, but it ignores cross-hauling, which is often most of international trade by volume.
Panel 3 of Table 2.1 shows the same exercise, except I use a different model to predict
trade flows. In some sense, the shares of demand and supply can be viewed as probability mass
functions. The share of demand for region 1 is the probability that any arbitrary unit of a good is
purchased by region 1. Likewise, the share of production for region 1 is the probability that any
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Table 2.1: Example Trade Matrices

R1
R2
R3
Supply

Baseline Trade Matrix
R1
R2
R3 Demand
0.38 0.08 0.04 0.5
0.02 0.23 0.04 0.29
0.02 0.04 0.15 0.21
0.42 0.35 0.23

Counterfactual Matrix: Net Trade
R1
R2
R3 Demand
R1 0.42
0
0
0.42
R2 0.06 0.29
0
0.35
R3 0.02
0
0.21 0.23
Supply 0.5
0.29 0.21 1
Counterfactual Matrix: Naïve Model
R1
R2
R3 Demand
R1 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.42
R2 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.35
R3 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.23
Supply 0.5
0.29 0.21 1
Counterfactual Matrix: Gravity Trade
R1
R2
R3 Demand
R1 0.35 0.05 0.02 0.42
R2 0.08 0.21 0.06 0.35
R3 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.23
Supply 0.5
0.29 0.21
Notes: These tables show different models predicting trade flows in a model using only the
distributions of world supply and demand. For all matrices, the rows represent demand and the
columns represent supply. The first panel is the baseline trade matrix, and the bottom three are
models predicting trade flows with different demand and supply distributions. The net trade
model only uses net exports and imports, the naïve model multiplies the two vectors, and the last
panel uses the gravity trade algorithm.
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arbitrary unit of a good was produced by region 1. One can then calculate the joint probability
mass function by simply multiplying the marginal distributions together. I call this the naïve
model. The matrix in panel 3 of Table 2.1 shows that this model generates a balanced matrix and
cross-hauling, however it evenly distributes trade flows throughout the matrix. In contrast, the
baseline matrix in panel 1 has much larger numbers along the diagonal. This is due to the
phenomenon of home-bias, where countries tend to purchase more from domestic sources than
foreign ones. I have not seen this model used in any trade models, however, it shows the main
issue with including cross-hauling, which is how much to include.
Finally, panel 4 shows the results from using the gravity algorithm put forth in this paper
to estimate trade flows. This creates a balanced matrix, so the equilibrium conditions still hold. It
also generates cross-hauling, which is shown by the non-zero entries for net importers. It is also
able to accommodate home-bias since this phenomenon is observed in the baseline matrix. Thus,
the algorithm generates empirical observations about trade only using the distribution of regional
supply and demand. The point of this exercise is to show the differences in the models, and why
certain assumptions were necessary to achieve observations seen in trade data. In section 2.4.a, I
use partial equilibrium models of this trade model to validate the gravity approach empirically.

2.3.e Government
There is a single government for each region that collects tariffs on imports and transfers
all revenues lump-sum back to the household. I do not consider other tax policies such as taxes
on labor and capital income, however any of these could be implemented with the correct data on
tax rates and revenues. Governments also do not spend any money directly, however
consumption shares in equation 7 are inclusive of government expenditures. Since the utility
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function is Cobb-Douglas, this is equivalent to a model that uses a constant share to split
government transfers and spending.
Tariffs are charged on imports at the border so that the price the consumer pays is the
world price plus the tariff. In a non-Armington model, the export supply curve is perfectly
elastic, so importers bear the full burden of the tariff. To calculate the domestic markup on
output from a particular industry, I use the trade flows from the previous section.
𝑅

𝑃𝑖𝑟𝐷

𝑗
𝐹̂𝑟𝑧

𝜏𝑖 )
𝑗 𝑟𝑧
𝑅
̂
∑ 𝐹
𝑧=1 𝑖=1 𝑖𝑧

= 𝑃𝑖 × (1 + ∑

The final price to domestic buyers of good 𝑖 in region 𝑟 is equal to the world price of that good,
𝑃𝑖 times an ad valorem tariff markup. The second term in the parentheses on the right-hand side
is the markup on the world price. For a given region 𝑟, the share of consumption subject to a
𝑗
tariff on goods from region 𝑧 is given by trade flows from 𝑧 to 𝑟, 𝐹̂𝑟𝑧 expressed as a share of all
𝑗
trade flows to 𝑟, ∑𝑅𝑖=1 𝐹̂𝑖𝑧 . This share of consumption is then multiplied by the ad valorem tariff
𝑖
rate on goods imported into region 𝑟 from 𝑧, 𝜏𝑟𝑧
. Recall that it is possible that 𝑧 = 𝑟, so all
𝑖
domestic consumption has a tariff rate of zero or 𝜏𝑟𝑟
= 0. Finally, total revenues collected on

tariffs are equal to
𝐽

𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑟 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖 ×
𝑖=1

𝑅

𝐽

𝑗
𝐹̂𝑟𝑧

(∑
𝜏𝑖 )
𝑗 𝑟𝑧
𝑅
̂
∑ 𝐹
𝑧=1 𝑖=1 𝑖𝑧

𝑖
)
× (𝐶𝑖𝑟 + ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑟
𝑗=1

(14)

Each term of the summation on the right-hand side is simply the world price times the total tariff
markup times the total consumption of good 𝑖. For each 𝑖 this is the total tariff bill collected on
consumption of that good in region 𝑟. I then sum over all goods to find the total revenue from
tariffs for region 𝑟.
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2.3.f Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this model is an allocation where all goods and factor markets clear given
each agents’ optimal conditions, government transfers, and trade costs. ormally, the equilibrium
conditions are

𝑅

𝐽

𝑅

𝑠
𝑖
)
∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑟
= ∑ (𝐶𝑖𝑟 + ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑟
𝑟=1

𝑟=1

∀

𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐽

(15)

𝑗=1

∗
𝑠
𝐿𝑗𝑟
= 𝐿𝑗𝑟
∀

𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅

𝐽

𝑅

∗
∑ ∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑟
𝑟=1 𝑗=1

= ∑ 𝐾𝑟

𝑅

T𝑟 = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑟

∀

(16)

(17)

𝑟=1

𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅

(18)

Optimal household demands for final consumption can be determined from equation (8)
and intermediate demands for production can be determined from equations (5) and (6). Taking
these together forms the goods market clearing condition in equation (15). Sectoral labor
supplies from equation (8) are equal to sectoral labor demands from equation (4) for all regions.
Capital is internationally mobile, so equation (17) clears the capital market by ensuring that the
sum of all capital demands for all industries and regions is equal to the sum of all capital
supplied by households. The last equation is the balanced budget constraint on the government.
Equation (18) simply says that all government revenues are transferred to households.
The model is solved in an iterative two step process. First, I make an initial guess for the
transportation matrix and calculate trade flows and costs based on this guess. Second, I solve the
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CGE model for a market clearing equilibrium using Merrill’s variant of Scarf’s algorithm. Once
the algorithm has found the market clearing allocation, I run the transportation matrix algorithm
presented in the previous section and check it against my guess. If the difference is larger than a
preset tolerance, I use the updated transportation matrix as my new guess and return to the first
step. The program terminates when an equilibrium is found that is sufficiently close to the
“guessed” trade matrix. This implies that all agents have perfect knowledge of all trade flows and
costs in the final equilibrium.

2.4 Data and Calibration
To calibrate the model, I create social accounting matrices for each country using data
from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). I include four countries in my model: Canada,
Mexico, the United States, and China. While China was not a member of NAFTA, they
embraced a more open trade policy during this time and became a strong trade partner with all
three member countries. The remaining countries are combined into a single region defined as
the Rest of the World (RoW). The WIOD contains information on production over 35 industries
and 40 countries. I take the disaggregated world input-output matrix and aggregate it to 20
industries and the 5 regions mentioned above (3 member countries plus China and RoW). The
aggregated industries are reported in Table 2.2, along with import and export information for
each industry for the United States. I define the period of my study as the ten-year period after
NAFTA was implemented, 1995 to 2005. While NAFTA was ratified the year prior to the start
of this period (in January 1994), 1995 was the earlier year in my dataset.
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Table 2.2: United States Trade Statistics for 1995 (in millions of $US 2013)
Industry
Imports
Exports
Net Exports
Agriculture, Hunting, and Fishing
$20,984.98
$27,256.18
$6,271.21
Mining and Quarrying
$48,006.81
$10,031.94
-$37,974.87
Food Products
$23,009.11
$32,342.49
$9,333.38
Textiles and Clothing
$53,416.78
$13,070.08
-$40,346.70
Footwear and Leather
$19,025.88
$967.37
-$18,058.51
Wood
$10,758.53
$4,805.96
-$5,952.57
Paper and Pulp
$24,676.88
$28,174.57
$3,497.69
Fuels
$9,946.21
$9,560.86
-$385.35
Chemicals
$52,476.24
$52,935.49
$459.25
Plastic or Rubber
$14,925.65
$10,915.90
-$4,009.75
Stone and Glass
$10,420.85
$5,235.23
-$5,185.62
Metals
$51,782.01
$29,378.16
-$22,403.84
Machinery and Electrical Equipment
$238,263.56
$188,550.82
-$49,712.74
Transportation Equipment
$120,382.65
$90,736.88
-$29,645.77
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
$33,373.04
$12,537.08
-$20,835.96
Utilities and Construction
$2,184.59
$443.54
-$1,741.05
Consumer goods
$6,413.18
$79,838.22
$73,425.04
Transportation Services
$21,553.41
$64,628.68
$43,075.26
Business Services
$5,971.33
$15,434.15
$9,462.83
Consumer Services
$68,681.13
$88,381.72
$19,700.58
Total
$836,252.81
$765,225.32
-$71,027.49
Notes: This table shows all industries and their respective volumes of import and exports. The
final column shows net exports. All values are in millions of $US.

Tariff data comes from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.
Specifically, I use the weighted tariff measure by commodity, origin, and destination. The
change in tariffs between 1995 and 2005 is shown in Figure 2.1. The left side of panels shows
tariff rates for each commodity in 1995, and the right panel shows tariff rates for those same
industries in 2005. Almost all tariff rates between the NAFTA countries have dropped to zero.
This is expected, as all tariff rates for this Free Trade Area fell to zero by 2004 per the conditions
of NAFTA. The commodity definitions between WITS and WIOD are not exactly direct, so I
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Figure 2.1: Tariff Rate Changes 1995-2005 for Manufacturing Industries

Notes: This figure shows all tariff changes for NAFTA member countries with their respective
member partners and China. The left panel shows tariff rates in 1995, the start of my analysis,
and the right panel shows the same rates in 2005, the end of my analysis. Agriculture tariffs in
1995 were well over 40% for some countries so they are omitted for visibility.
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create a crosswalk between WITS and WIOD. The mapping between industries are shown in
appendix Table B.1.
The model is calibrated by first setting elasticity parameters using my estimates or taking
estimates from previous literature. The elasticity of substation over intermediate goods, 𝜎, is set
to 0.5. Parameters of the top level of the Cobb-Douglas production function, 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐, are set
according to expenditure shares in production. These are unique to each industry and region and
based on social accounting matrices I built from WIOD data. The labor sector elasticity
parameter is set to 1.22 according to the estimation in chapter 1. The impact of trade costs on
trade flows in equation is determined using the tariff elasticity, 𝜔, which partly determines
changes in trade flows in the gravity algorithm. I use a value of 7.7, which is the average trade
elasticity measured by Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic, and Keeney (2007). Other papers use a higher
elasticity, such as Caliendo and Parro (2015), who also study NAFTA and use an average trade
elasticity closer to 11. In the results section I run the simulation again under higher and lower
elasticities to test the sensitivity of my results to these parameters.

2.4.a Empirical Comparison of Armington and Gravity Model
The gravity model I put forward in section 2.3.c is a new one, even though it has largely
the same form as previous gravity models in the literature. In this section, I test it empirically in
partial equilibrium to ensure it reliably predicts trade flows. I use data on production,
consumption, prices, and trade flows among the 5 regions in my dataset for 20 commodity
categories for the years 1995 to 2011. Using consumption and production quantities, I predict
trade flows using the gravity model. Using prices, I predict the same trade flows using the
Armington model. Information on how I estimated the models can be found in Appendix A. I
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compare the two models with standard techniques to assess the goodness of fit. First, scatterplots
of actual vs. predicted values is presented in Figure 2.2. The left column of panels show the
Figure 2.2: Trade Flow Prediction Accuracy of Armington and Gravity Model

Notes: This figure plots predicted trade flows against actual trade flows organized by model type
and sample used. The top two panels show the prediction from the Armington model and the
bottom panels show the prediction from the gravity model developed in this paper. This figure is
intended to show that the gravity model I use is at least as accurate as the Armington model in
predicting trade flows.
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Armington and gravity models’ performance when I use the full dataset to estimate the
parameters in the model. The right column shows the performance of predicted outcomes for
only 2011 using data from before 2000. The purpose of these graphs is to see how the models
perform in out-of-sample prediction.
Visually, the gravity model performs better than the Armington model in predicting trade
flows. This is confirmed by goodness-of-fit statistics: R-squared for the Armington in-sample
model is 0.66 and for the gravity model it is 0.95. Additionally, the mean squared error (MSE) of
the Armington in-sample prediction is 7.95 × 108 and for the gravity model MSE was 0.8 ×
108 . This is not surprising as gravity models are often lauded for their accuracy in the trade
literature. Employing the gravity model empirically may be difficult in some scenarios since
information on production, consumption, and trade flows for the entire world is needed to
parametrize and run the model. However, it works well with this CGE model and predicts trade
flows at least as well as, or better than, the Armington model.

2.5 Results
To simulate NAFTA, I use the typical practice in applied general equilibrium of
simulating a baseline scenario where tariffs are kept at their 1995 levels. I then simulate a
counterfactual scenario where tariffs are reduced to their 2005 levels. Note that I include all tariff
reductions for the counterfactual scenario, so in some sense it is not a pure evaluation of
NAFTA. However, tariff changes with partners outside of NAFTA were much smaller than those
with partners inside.
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To compare these results to the simulations used in Kehoe (2005), I have recreated his
methodology in comparing simulation results to the data. He does this by using simple linear
regression between the data and the model. Specifically, the model he estimates is
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 × 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖
Where 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑖 is the vector of changes observed in the data, and 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖 is the vector of changes
predicted by the model. The parameter 𝑎 is the intercept and 𝑏 is the slope of the regression line
between the results from the data and the results from the model. If the model perfectly predicted
the data, then the slope would be one and the intercept would be zero. So, the deviation of these
estimated parameters from those values indicates how well the model predicts the changes seen
in the data. The slope shows how well the magnitudes in the data and model predictions match
each other. The intercept shows how far the overall averages are from each other. Kehoe does
not include which of these is the more important statistic, but they both contain information on
prediction accuracy.
Table 2.3 presents the results on overall changes in trade flows between NAFTA
members. The first column shows the changes that are observed in the data. These are expressed
in terms relative to GDP. Since my model is not dynamic, I am not accounting for economic
growth in the model. However, this follows directly from Kehoe’s methodology. The second
column shows the changes in trade predicted by my CGE model. The model correctly predicts
that the largest changes will be on Mexico. However, the model underpredicts changes in
Canadian trade flows by about half. The model also underpredicts the large increase in US
imports. However, this large change may have been due to large capital inflows into the US,
which the model does not account for.
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Table 2.3: Total Trade Flow Results from NAFTA Simulation

Trade Flow
Canada Imports
Canada Exports
Mexico Imports
Mexico Exports
USA Imports
USA Exports
China Imports
China Exports

Data
46
47
88
71
71
24
141
152

Tariff Change
Only
23
24
59
77
24
23
59
79

Tariff Change &
Tech. Change
19
25
61
81
25
27
111
79

BrownDeardorffStern
4
4
34
51
2
3
-

2.43
Slope
1.36
1.09
23.20
Intercept
17.41
21.90
0.64
Correlation
0.75
0.82
Notes: This table shows trade flows changes for each of the directions listed in the left column.
The second column is the changes in trade in the data relative to GDP growth. The third and
fourth columns are predictions from the non-Armington model, and the last column is the
prediction from the BDS model from Kehoe (2005). The regression statistics at the bottom
indicate the how well the predictions fit the data. If the predictions perfectly fit the data, the
slope would be 1, the intercept would be 0, and correlation would be 1. Deviations from these
values determines how well the prediction matches the data.

The results on trade flows for China show that the perfect substitutes model does
underpredict trade changes in China. Much of this is likely because I am not including any form
of technological change during the sample period. China, however, went through a fast industrial
revolution during this time. This is shown in Figure 2.3, where I plot the share of value-added
income that went to capital in each year. While NAFTA members varied slightly over the period,
on average, all of them ended up at roughly the same point in 2005 that they were at in 1995. The
major exception is China, who experienced capital-biased growth in manufacturing sectors. This
rapid change resulted in an increase of 10 percentage points in the share of income going to
capital.
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To see how this affects my results, I run a second simulation where I change the tariff
rates and parameters in the production function. In the counterfactual simulation, the parameter
on capital is increased by 10 percentage points for and the other parameters are decreased to
maintain constant returns to scale. This change is only for manufacturing firms in China. The
results are presented in the second column of Table 2.3. Trade changes for China are much larger
Figure 2.3: Capital Income Shares in Manufacturing Industries During NAFTA

Notes: This figure shows the share of value-added income that went to capital in each year from
1995-2005. This includes only select manufacturing industries; however, these were industries
that experienced large changes in tariffs. While NAFTA member countries, Canada, Mexico, and
the US ended in about the same place, China saw a general increase over this period.

74

under this specification, and the regression results indicate a slightly better fit to the observed
trade changes. The slope of the regression line falls to 1.09, the intercept increases to 21.9, and
the correlation coefficient increases to 0.82. Interestingly, trade flow changes in the NAFTA
member countries are not heavily impacted by the technological change. Trade flow changes are
about the same as they were when I only considered the change in tariffs.
To compare this to simulations used in Kehoe (2005), I also include his results from
simulations of the Brown-Deardorff-Stern (BDS) CGE model analyzing the effects of NAFTA.
While this model used a different time period, 1988 to 1999, the changes in trade were of similar
magnitudes. To make a more direct comparison, I use the regression results from the original
paper. The first observation that stands out is how much smaller the magnitudes are than the data
and the perfect substitutes model. Mexico is the only country whose trade changes hit double
digits. This is confirmed by the statistics from the regression model. The slope of the regression
line for the perfect substitutes model is 1.34 and the intercept is 17.5. Compared to the results
from the BDS model, which has a slope of 2.43 and an intercept of 23.2, the perfect substitutes
model does a better job of capturing the magnitude of changes from NAFTA. We can also
compare the fit of the model to the data using the Pearson correlation coefficient. The perfect
substitutes model is able achieve a correlation coefficient of 0.75, which is slightly higher than
the correlation for the BDS model of 0.64.
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Table 2.4: Results on Exports from NAFTA Simulation

Canada

Data
Non-Arm.
BDS

Exports to:
Mexico
USA
27.62
394.27
21.75
90.99
-0.22
49.80

Mexico

Data
Non-Arm.
BDS

Canada
128.08
227.35
3.98

USA
2.90
84.47
0.29

Data
Non-Arm.
BDS

Canada
70.70
4.41
19.96

Mexico
38.37
22.32
1.24

Non-Arm.
BDS

Slope
0.5
6.8

Intercept
72.4
25.2

United States

Notes: This table shows exports between NAFTA members and their respective member
partners. For each table, Data is the observed change in the data, Non-Arm. is the prediction
from the non-Armington model, and BDS is the predicted changes from Kehoe (2005). The last
two rows show the slope coefficients between the data and the model like in Table 2.3.

I can also compare specific trade relationships to those presented in Kehoe (2005).
Exports for the NAFTA member countries and their member partners are presented in Table 2.5.
There are three sections in the table that present trade changes for Canada, Mexico, and the
United States. Note this differs from Table 2.3 by reporting changes with specific partners rather
than overall trade. I use the results from the simulation only taking into account the tariff
changes, and I am not including the technological change in China. The non-Armington model is
able to generate large changes in trade here as well. While I overshoot changes in exports from
Mexico to the US and changes in exports from the US to Canada, I am able to generate the large
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changes in trade seen in Mexico and Canada. Results from the BDS model show the contrast of
changes. The BDS model mostly predicts small, single-digit changes from Mexican exports (less
than 10%), and the non-Armington model is able to generate changes of over 100%. On average,
the non-Armington model under predicts the changes in trade by about 32% and the BDS model
under predicts trade by 89%. The regression statistics confirm this, while the BDS model has a
lower intercept than the non-Armington model, the slope is much higher, indicating a poor fit
with the magnitudes observed in the data.
In the last set of results, I explore other effects of NAFTA to show how the model can be
used to analyze the effects of NAFTA. In Table 2.4, I present changes in labor demands for each
sector in the four countries of my study. Again, these results are from the simulation only
including the change in tariffs and does not include the technological change from China. All
countries see a decline in labor demand for the agriculture sector as production shifts to the Rest
of the World region. The biggest changes are for Mexico and China in the manufacturing sectors.
Both see large increases in labor demand for clothing manufacturing like Textiles and Clothing
and Footwear and Leather. However, there are also large increases in demand in Mexico for
Metals, Machinery and Electrical Equipment, and Transportation equipment. The US sees the
smallest changes in labor demands across all countries. Overall, the US sees a 0.04% reduction
labor demand in the manufacturing sectors and a 0.01% increase in the services sectors. This is
likely because the US already had low tariffs in 1995 compared to Mexico and Canada, which
can be seen in Figure 2.1. So, gains from reducing tariffs are likely smaller in the US than
Canada and Mexico.
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Table 2.5: Labor Demand Impacts from NAFTA Simulation
Industry
Agriculture, Hunting, and Fishing
Mining and Quarrying
Food Products
Textiles and Clothing
Footwear and Leather
Wood
Paper and Pulp
Fuels
Chemicals
Plastic or Rubber
Stone and Glass
Metals
Machinery and Electrical Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Utilities and Construction
Consumer goods
Transportation Services
Business Services
Consumer Services
Total Manufacturing
Total Services

China
-3.0%
-0.3%
-4.1%
18.1%
34.5%
4.6%
1.8%
1.2%
1.7%
9.0%
0.2%
1.3%
9.7%
14.3%
10.0%
-0.5%
-0.8%
-0.6%
-1.9%
-0.7%

Canada
-3.1%
0.3%
-3.8%
6.7%
3.6%
-6.2%
0.8%
4.3%
4.3%
3.6%
1.0%
5.0%
5.2%
14.7%
1.9%
1.0%
-0.5%
-0.8%
-1.1%
-1.1%

Mexico
-1.8%
-2.2%
13.4%
44.6%
13.3%
6.3%
6.8%
-1.0%
0.2%
6.4%
-2.6%
17.3%
37.6%
33.5%
15.0%
-0.3%
-2.6%
-3.2%
-4.8%
-4.1%

USA
-0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
-0.2%
-1.1%
0.1%
0.0%
0.3%
0.1%
-0.2%
0.1%
0.2%
-0.2%
-0.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

5.77%
-1.01%

3.96%
-0.77%

16.47%
-3.63%

-0.04%
0.01%

Notes: This table shows the changes in labor demand predicted by the non-Armington model. All
values represent changes between the baseline equilibrium and the counterfactual equilibrium.
Note that total labor supply is set in this model, so total labor demand changes are zero.

Changes in capital demands tell a similar story. Capital use by firms in the US drop
across all sectors. Mexico, on the other hand, experiences huge capital inflows, particularly in the
manufacturing sectors. Textiles and Clothing doubles its capital use and Machinery and
Electrical Equipment increases capital by 87%. Overall, capital demand for manufacturing
industries jumps by 32%. Canada also experiences an increase in capital use, albeit smaller than
Mexico at 7.9%. Lastly, China also experiences large capital inflows. While other countries
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experienced a marked shift of capital from services to manufacturing, both sectors increase
capital use in China. The manufacturing sectors increase capital demand by 11.2% and demand
for capital in service industries increases by 1.1%.
The model presented here is highly abstract, and it is only presented in a static context.
However, in future research, a dynamic portion could be added to adjust factors over time. This
would provide a more realistic evolution of capital by including a market for savings and
investment. In addition, more realism could be added to the labor market. In this model, I assume
that total labor is supplied inelastically and workers use sectoral wages to decide how to allocate
labor across sectors. This could be altered to include a labor-leisure choice or even possibly
involuntary unemployment. While this would provide a better theoretical foundation for the
model, several aspects of free trade agreements can be generated even using this simple model.

2.5.a Sensitivity
I now turn to sensitivity checks to see how robust the model is to changes of parameters
that I either estimated or took from the literature. To test the model under these changes, I select
a new parameter value and recalibrate the model changing only that parameter. I choose three
parameters, the tariff elasticity, the substitution elasticity in the intermediate composite, and the
labor sector elasticity. While the model technically uses hundreds of parameters in the
production functions, consumption composites, and trade flow matrices, these are all pinned
down by the dataset. The model is built such that I choose a set of elasticity parameters and then
solve for the remaining parameters assuming that the baseline dataset represents an equilibrium
allocation.

79

The results from the sensitivity analysis are shown in Table 2.6. This table recreates the
main results in Table 2.3. The first two columns are the changes observed in the data and the
baseline specification. The next two columns show the changes when the trade elasticity is set to
5.5 and 11. The lower value 5.5 is taken from Hertel (2007). The authors argue that this value is
average elasticity that previous versions of the CGE model GTAP used, as compared to the
updated model that uses an average value of 7.7. The second value of 11 comes from Caliendo
and Parro (2015), who use an Eaton-Kortum model to estimate trade elasticities.
The results from these two specifications indicate that my model is the most sensitive to
these parameter values. Trade changes are muted when the trade elasticity is set to 5.5 and much
higher when the elasticity is set to 11. However, the magnitudes of the changes are still higher
than those predicted by the BDS model, even when using the lower trade elasticity value. The
relative distribution of changes remains largely the same – Mexico and China experience the
largest trade impacts. The proportional change in trade changes is about the same as the
proportional change in trade elasticities. Doubling the trade elasticity from 5.5 to 11 causes about
a doubling of the magnitudes of the predicted changes.
The next three columns show the results from simulations where the elasticity on the
intermediate composite is changed. I consider three values: 0.25, 0.75, and 1.25. Although
smaller values of this elasticity give more muted changes, the differences between the
specifications are very small. The final two columns show results from changing the labor sector
elasticity. While access to labor markets and movements between them drive a lot of the
comparative advantage in this model, the differences between the two models are surprisingly
small. Additionally, a smaller labor sector elasticity leads to a slightly different distribution of

80

Table 2.6: Sensitivity Results

Canada Imports
Canada Exports
Mexico Imports
Mexico Exports
USA Imports
USA Exports
China Imports
China Exports

Data

Baseline

46
47
88
71
71
24
141
152

23
24
59
77
24
23
59
79

Tariff Elasticity
5.5
11
15
16
34
49
16
15
23
39

Production Elasticity
0.25
0.75
1.25

30
31
86
105
28
28
100
124

23
24
58
74
21
21
61
82

24
25
59
78
22
21
65
85

23
25
63
82
23
22
69
86

Labor Elasticity
0.25
2.5
21
23
60
79
22
22
67
87

23
25
58
77
22
22
63
78

Slope
1.36
1.63
0.92
1.36
1.31
1.24
1.26
1.37
Intercept
17.41
37.64 18.67
17.73
17.71
18.76
19.58
16.84
Correlation
0.75
0.48
0.83
0.78
0.79
0.78
0.79
0.77
Notes: This table presents sensitivity analysis for the model. For each column, the columns in Table 2.3 are replicated under different
elasticity assumptions. The first two columns come from Table 2.3. Columns 3 and 4 vary the tariff elasticity, columns 5-7 vary the
production elasticity, and columns 8 and 9 vary the labor sector supply elasticity. Regression statistics are calculated for each column
as in Table 2.3.
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trade changes. Increases in trade for Mexico and China are smaller and increases for Canada are
slightly higher.
For the most part, the conclusion that we see larger changes in trade from a nonArmington model seems robust to most parameter choices. However, much like Armington
models, the changes in trade are most sensitive to the choice of trade elasticity. Getting estimates
of trade elasticities is inherently difficult. Some researchers have argued that the use of price
differentials instead of trade costs have led to smaller elasticities. Going forward, I may be able
to use tariff changes to estimate trade elasticities rather than price differentials to fit this model.
If tariff changes are assumed to be exogenous, then the impact on trade flows can possibly be
identified. However, the trade elasticity question seems to remain a difficulty of trade model
calibration.

2.6 Conclusion
As more countries continue to embrace free trade, governments will want to analyze the
effects of such agreements. CGE modeling is a natural choice for this work since it can be used
to perform counterfactual policy analysis. In addition, CGE analysis can be used to analyze the
distribution of effects across sectors. When applied to international trade, many CGE models use
the Armington assumption to model trade. Recent evaluations of the Armington model have
identified some questions about its applicability to policy changes, especially free trade
agreements. The use of the Armington assumption in analysis of free trade agreements may lead
to muted changes in trade.
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In this paper, I create a non-Armington CGE model with homogeneous goods that
includes trade flows. I prevent perfect specialization by including frictions in the labor market, as
previous models have done. I extend the literature by including an algorithm that predicts trade
flows using the distribution of regional consumption and production instead of price
differentials. This allows me to include empirically observed trade phenomena such as crosshauling and home-bias in a homogeneous goods model. The model I specify is highly abstract,
production and utility functions are Cobb-Douglas and government interactions are minimal.
Even using this model, I can generate larger changes in trade than CGE models using the
traditional Armington assumption.
The non-Armington model has several desirable features that may make it useful in
policy analysis in other areas of research. One extension is creating a state-level model for the
US. This would allow analysis how policy impacts are distributed geographically. In addition,
models of regional migration could be included to determine the impact of labor mobility
between states. Other applications could be for situations where the modeler has reason to
believe the region in question has very little impact on world prices. The non-Armington model
is a useful framework in these cases, and using the algorithm developed in this paper, multilateral trade flows can be included in such a model. In future research, I plan to look for new
policy applications and improve the empirical strength of the algorithm predicting trade flows.
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Chapter 3: The Clean Air Act Amendment and Missed Work
3.1 Introduction
In 1963 the Clean Air Act was signed into law by Lyndon B. Johnson. It was one of the
first regulations of air pollution at the federal level in the United States. Researchers have since
worked to examine the impacts on the labor market. Typically, this is framed in a simple benefitcost analysis. Labor costs are employment losses and sectoral reallocations from production
restrictions. However, labor supply can also increase on the intensive margin. Improved health
for workers could mean higher productivity at work. Workers may increase attendance, or they
may be more productive while on the job.
The literature on the effect of the Clean Air Act on employment shows a consistently
negative impact on the quantity of labor supplied and demanded in affected industries.
Greenstone (2002) used the initial Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970 to identify an
environmental policy impact and found that regulated counties lost 590,000 jobs in comparison
to unregulated counties. Another study by Walker (2013) looks closer at the transitional costs
employees face when regulation destroys jobs in the polluting sector. He finds that workers who
leave the industry after regulation receive a lower wage in their new industry, on average. The
present value of total forgone earnings for those separated from their firm is equal to 1.2 times
one year of pre-regulatory earnings.
Other studies have explored the public health impacts of the Clean Air Act using various
measures. One of the first studies to do this was Greenstone (2003) which looked at the effect on
infant mortality rates. He found that a 1% reduction in total suspended particles led to a 0.3%
reduction in infant mortality rates. A working paper from Bishop et al. (2018) analyzed the effect
of PM 2.5 on Alzheimer's disease using the 2004 Clean Air Act Amendment to identify the
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policy effect. They find that a 1 microgram per cubic meter increase in particulate matter
exposure led to a 3% increase in dementia cases.
Recently there has also been work on how pollution affects labor supply and productivity.
If pollution damages health status, then workers may need to take more sick days, or it could
make their jobs more difficult. One recent study found that exposure of 25 days or more to 10
ppb increased PM 2.5 reduced the productivity of manufacturing workers in China by about 1%
(He et al., 2019). Another earlier study found slightly larger effects when focusing on
agricultural workers; increased ozone levels contributed to a 4% loss in productivity (Zivin and
Neidell, 2012). Another paper used data on German football players and air pollution at matches
and found a negative impact on measures of player productivity (Lichter et al. 2017).
Previous research on the connection between air pollution and labor supply have looked
at short term changes in pollution and "restricted activity days" or RADs. This term encompasses
work lost due to air pollution and days spent in bed. Most of these studies use the National
Health Interview Survey (NHIS) conducted by the Center for Disease Control (CDC). Ostro and
Rothschild (1989) and Ostro (1987) are commonly cited studies in discussions about RADs.
These papers have also commented on at-work productivity in the form of "minor restricted
activity days" or MRADs. MRADs are when a worker can attend work but reports limitations in
being able to perform tasks. Other studies such as Hausman and Ostro (1984) have considered
the impact of pollution on missed days at work using Poisson modeling.
More recently, a paper estimated the causal effect of pollution on labor supply by
examining workers in Mexico City. The subjects lived near a polluting factory that closed
suddenly and led to a decrease in pollution in the nearby area. Using this quasi-experiment, the
author was able to estimate that a 20% decline in sulfur dioxide concentrations led to a 1.3-hour
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increase in work attendance the following week (Hanna and Oliva 2015). Another paper
considers long term effects by exploiting variation in the Clean Air Act Amendment. The authors
find that earnings and labor force participation are reduced later in life for people born in higher
pollution areas (Isen, Rossin-Slater, and Walker 2017).
Researchers have not estimated the effect of the CAAA on labor supply directly;
however, the EPA has considered this benefit in their report on the CAAA. They estimate that
without the CAAA 17 million workdays would have been lost due to illness in 2010 for which
they assessed the value at $2.7 billion. This number was reached by looking at income losses due
to diseases caused or exacerbated by air pollution. Using BenMAP, an air pollution simulation
model, they predict the effect of regulation on pollution and the incidence of respiratory diseases.
The EPA converts this income loss into days of work missed using average wage rates.
However, no direct empirical measure of the impact of CAAA on lost workdays due to illness
exists to my knowledge.
In this paper, I first discuss the decision to take sick leave by workers, and how this
decision is impacted if a worker has paid sick leave. I show that estimates of productivity gains
could be biased upwards if only illness hazard rates are used. I then estimate the impact of the
2004 CAAA ozone regulations on missed workdays. I do this by specifying a Difference-inDifference model, which estimates the causal impact of the policy by comparing a treatment
group to a control group. Since the CAAA only affected certain counties that had historically
high levels of pollution, I identify the treated group by location. I find that the Clean Air Act
Amendment reduced the probability of missing work due to illness by about 0.1 percentage
points.
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3.2 Clean Air Act Amendment of 2004
The policy I consider is the Clean Air Act Amendment of 2004. These amendments
updated the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone and PM2.5 (particulate
matter) concentrations. The policy was first proposed in 1997, and, after several years in court,
was enacted in 2003 and began enforcement in summer of 2004. As a result, 436 counties were
designated as "nonattainment" for not meeting ozone concentration standards. States with
nonattainment areas were then required to submit a State Implementation Plan (SIP) which
details how governments will reduce ambient pollutant concentrations. The plans were due back
to the EPA in 2004, which was when states began implementing restrictions on air pollution.
In this paper, I focus on ozone concentration which is known to be harmful to respiratory
health. I am currently working on mapping PM 2.5 counties as well, and there is likely a large
overlap. The comparison of these pollutants is important, and it could provide a useful second
source of variation. For now, the empirical portion of this paper only includes nonattainment
areas for ozone concentration. Figure 3.1 shows the effect of the NAAQS on ozone pollution
using data from the EPA. This figure shows the average of the second highest daily one-hour
ozone reading in attainment and non-attainment counties in each year. The underlying data has
an observation for each county using and each year, yielding 13,255 observations. I then take the
simple average by attainment status and plot this statistic over the years 1996-2009. Counties in
the control group who retained attainment status are shown by the broken red line and circle
points. Counties in the treatment group that were classified as non-attainment are shown in blue
solid line with triangle points. All points are shown relative to the first pre-treatment year 2003.
The figure shows that ozone levels were trending downward in general during the total sample
period. However, after the implementation of the NAAQS in 2003, the non-attainment counties
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decrease ozone by a greater amount than counties that were designated attainment status. It is
important to note that these statistics do not consider strategic monitor placement. If nonattainment counties simply moved monitors to cleaner areas or only operated them on low
pollution days, these results will be biased. Using satellite imagery to measure air pollution may
be a possible solution to this, but the images needed to make these datasets may not be available
for the early 2000s.
Figure 3.1: Average of 2nd Highest Ozone Readings in Attainment vs. Non-Attainment
Counties

Notes: This figure shows the average of the 2nd highest reading across all counties in the
attainment area. The 2nd highest reading of ozone in a county is an index of ozone pollution
produced by the EPA. For each year, observations for each county and year are obtained from
the EPA air quality index annual records. I then group all counties as Attainment and NonAttainment and take a simple average across them to produce the point estimates in each year.
The vertical dashed line at 2003 indicates the last pre-period year.
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3.2.a Hazard Rate for Illness and Sick Days
In this paper by “sick days,” I am referring to short term leave due to temporary illness. I
am not considering long term illness that may push somebody out of the labor market for an
extended period.
An increase in the labor supply (decrease in sick days) is often put into the benefits
column when judging environmental policy. The argument is clear: less pollution means less sick
time and more production. So even if policy makers were only using gross domestic product or
some similar measure as a goal, there would still be a reason to enact pollution regulation. For
example, lost productivity (LP) might be expressed as the number of sick days taken in a year
such as the following.
𝐿𝑃 = 𝜃(𝑞) × 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 × 260
Where 𝜃(𝑞) is the probability of getting sick given some level of environmental quality q. So,
the gain in productivity (reduction in lost productivity) would be

𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 = −

𝜕𝐿𝑃
𝜕𝜃
=−
× 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 × 260
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑞

𝑎𝑛𝑑

𝜕𝜃
<0
𝜕𝑞

One problem researchers have noted is that this measure does not include the possibility of
averting or mitigating behavior. So, assuming the probability of taking a sick day is 𝑠(𝜃) a more
proper measure of a gain in productivity might be

𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 = −

𝜕𝑠 𝜕𝜃
×
× 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 × 260
𝜕𝜃 𝜕𝑞
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The new term on the right-hand side reflects the possibility of attending work while sick or other
mitigating behavior. If researchers simply use the first equation, then they implicitly assume
𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝜃

= 1 and the results will be biased upward. However, even if researchers account for

mitigation, results may be biased upward if some workers have unpaid sick leave. Workers may
strategically go to work sick and save their banked sick day. This choice means that even if the
government policy lowers the probability of getting sick, the presence of paid sick leave may
reduce the number of people who attend work while sick. If the government can credibly commit
to the policy, then the probability of getting sick is lower, but it is also lower in the future. Since
part of the opportunity cost of taking a sick day today is the inability to take a sick day
tomorrow, a lower probability of getting sick tomorrow means a lower opportunity cost to taking
a sick day today. A simple model of paid sick leave and pollution is presented in Appendix C.
While this is an interesting avenue of research, due to data limitations, this paper does not
include empirical estimates of this effect.

3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
I use the current population survey (CPS) basic monthly questionnaire to create the
sample to estimate my model. Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.1, where all
observations are separated by attainment status. Table 3.2 the same except the sample is
restricted to only employed persons. Using geographic variables, I can identify whether a
household was in a non-attainment area. I use demographics to create a vector of person-specific
variables. Survey respondents indicate how many hours each household member worked last
week. They also report how many hours each household member usually works per week. If
somebody worked part-time in the previous week, they also note why they worked part-time or
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for All Observations
Variable
Employed
Hourly Wage
Hours Worked
Age
Female
White
Married
High School
College

Obs
6,561,067
556,757
3,820,211
6,561,067
6,561,067
6,561,067
6,561,067
6,561,067
6,561,067

Attainment
Mean
0.65
13.49
40.63
47.51
0.52
0.87
0.61
0.53
0.34

Std. Dev.
0.48
7.23
11.76
16.88
0.50
0.34
0.49
0.50
0.47

Min
0
5.15
0
20
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
99.5
120
90
1
1
1
1
1

Non-Attainment
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev. Min
Max
Employed
2,778,904
0.65
0.48
0
1
Hourly Wage
214,927
14.25
8.26
5.15
99.5
Hours Worked
1,657,315
40.53
10.92
0
120
Age
2,778,904
46.43
16.64
20
90
Female
2,778,904
0.53
0.50
0
1
White
2,778,904
0.79
0.41
0
1
Married
2,778,904
0.57
0.49
0
1
High School
2,778,904
0.48
0.50
0
1
College
2,778,904
0.38
0.48
0
1
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for observations in attainment and non-attainment
counties. The top panel shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for each
variable. All observations are included, however only observations recorded on the supplemental
survey in March include hourly wages. Hours worked are listed in the CPS data as “usual hours
worked”. The maximum hourly wage is $99.5 per hour and the maximum hours worked per
week is 120.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Sample Restricted to Employed Individuals
Attainment
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev. Min
Max
4,247,386
1
0
1
1
556,475
13.49
7.23
5.15
99.5
3,816,402
40.67
11.70
1
120
4,247,386
42.27
12.77
20
90
4,247,386
0.48
0.50
0
1
4,247,386
0.87
0.33
0
1
4,247,386
0.63
0.48
0
1
4,247,386
0.52
0.50
0
1
4,247,386
0.39
0.49
0
1
Non-Attainment
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev. Min
Max
Employed
1,807,804
1
0
1
1
Hourly Wage
214,830
14.25
8.26
5.15
99.5
Hours Worked
1,656,058
40.56
10.86
1
120
Age
1,807,804
41.66
12.54
20
90
Female
1,807,804
0.47
0.50
0
1
White
1,807,804
0.80
0.40
0
1
Married
1,807,804
0.59
0.49
0
1
High School
1,807,804
0.46
0.50
0
1
College
1,807,804
0.44
0.50
0
1
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for observations in attainment and non-attainment
counties. The top panel shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for each
variable. Only observations that report some form of employment are included, however only
observations recorded on the supplemental survey in March include hourly wages. Hours worked
are listed in the CPS data as “usual hours worked”. The maximum hourly wage is $99.5 per hour
and the maximum hours worked per week is 120.
Variable
Employed
Hourly Wage
Hours Worked
Age
Female
White
Married
High School
College

were absent from work. These two variables allow me to observe hours missed due to illness for
a national sample.
There are two primary issues with the data. The first is matching the geography to
households. The CPS censors some of this information for privacy concerns, which can lead to
some issues. The primary problem is that geographic variables do not exactly line up to
regulation boundaries. The Current Population Survey does not report counties for all
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observations to maintain privacy. Instead, data on county or metropolitan area are indicated
depending on the size of the county or metro area. However, since most non-attainment areas
were urban, it is possible to identify most non-attainment areas. Using a combination of county
and metropolitan areas I create a mapping of CPS observations to non-attainment and attainment
areas. Using this matching strategy, I end up with some overlap between areas. So, some
households that are in non-attainment areas may be mislabeled as being in an attainment area and
vice-versa. Counties that are not identified in the CPS represent less than 7% of the regulated
counties.
Tying a concentration of ozone to locations identified is difficult for two reasons. The
first is because the household may simply be part of a larger metropolitan area. Suppose I have a
single state such as Georgia which has some counties that switched to non-attainment status
because of the CAAA. The map in Figure 3.2 shows the non-attainment areas in blue and other
attainment areas identified by the CPS in red. The CPS identifies some of the non-attainment
counties directly, and some are included in larger metropolitan areas such as the Atlanta area. So,
it is possible that some entire metro areas are identified as non-attainment even though they
contain some counties identified as attainment. So, it is unclear how to assign pollution monitors
since there will likely be several in a large metro area. Additionally, if a person is not in a nonattainment (blue filled) area, then I know they are in Georgia and not in a regulated county. This
means they are somewhere in the white area, but I cannot tell where so assigning a pollution
monitor is even more difficult. One possibility is using an average weighted by population
measured by the ACS. This will assign a state-wide average pollution level for attainment
counties, so it is unclear how closely this matches local conditions.

93

The second major limitation of the data is the lack of an hourly wage variable. The CPS only
asks detailed information about earnings for the outgoing rotation groups, so including an hourly
wage measure cuts the sample by 90%. However, I may be able to overcome this with my
difference in difference approach. While wages were higher in the non-attainment areas, we need
to compare the difference in changes over time. For the sample that I have, the change in wages
was largely the same between the two attainment and nonattainment areas. However, wages in
the non-attainment areas fell slightly during the regulation period relative to the attainment areas.
I show the change in wages relative to 2003 in Figure 3.3. My simple model of sick leave in the
previous section predicts that, in general, workers are less likely to miss work as wages increase.
Although, the effect could go the other way if higher wages mean more access to sick leave
benefits. Keeping this in mind I now turn to the model using the full sample and dropping hourly
wages from my analysis.
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Figure 3.2: Map of Attainment, Non-Attainment, and CPS Identified Areas in Georgia

Notes: This figure shows attainment and non-attainment counties in Georgia, along with the
counties that are identified by the CPS. Blue counties were designated as non-attainment
counties by the 2004 CAAA ozone regulations. All blue counties are identified in the CPS. Red
counties were designated attainment counties and are also identified in the CPS data. White
counties are attainment counties that are not identified in the CPS data due to censoring of lowpopulation areas. This map was created using software from www.diymaps.net.
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Figure 3.3: Hourly Wages Over Time

Notes: This graph shows the hourly wage relative to 2003 (vertical axis) over the years in the
sample period (horizontal axis). The dashed line with red circle points represents the areas
designated as attainment, and the blue solid line with triangle points represents the hourly wage
in non-attainment areas. The vertical dashed line at 2003 indicates the last pre-period year.

3.3.a Model Description
I study the impact of the CAAA on lost workdays using a difference-in-difference (DiD)
model. Using data from states with at least one non-attainment area I compare households that
lived in a non-attainment area and those that lived in an attainment area. The assumption is that
areas that were designated non-attainment saw a decline in pollutants regulated under the CAAA.
I use this variation to identify the effect of air pollution regulation on sick leave. I define the
following econometric model:
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝑿𝒊 + 𝜇𝑖
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The above equation is the central research question for this paper. The outcome variable is a
binary variable indicated whether or not person 𝑖 took at least one day of leave in the reference
week. The reason for leave can vary for the specification. In the main analysis, I include whether
or not the person took leave giving the reason “sick leave,” but I also include specifications
where the worker took leave for other given reasons, such as vacation. NonAttain is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the respondent is in a non-attainment area, and Post is equal to 1 if the
observation is after 2003. The coefficient on the interaction of these two variables is the result of
interest. Variables 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ are state and month fixed effects. I use state fixed effects to
account for unobserved heterogeneity by location. Month fixed effects are included to account
for unobserved heterogeneity over the year, since sick days are clearly correlated with seasons.
The variable 𝜇 is an idiosyncratic disturbance term assumed to be distributed normally with
mean zero. The matrix 𝑿 is a collection of demographic variables: age, sex, marital status, race,
education, and usual hours worked.
This method is like that used by Walker (2013), whereas Greenstone and Chay (2003)
use an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Using an IV approach is appealing because it gives
the marginal effect of pollution concentration changes on outcome variables. Greenstone and
Chay utilize datasets with fine geographic detail, which allows them to use attainment status to
instrument a local pollution level. Due to the nature of CPS data restrictions, this may be
unfeasible for this study. As I discussed before, given that a person is in an attainment area, I am,
in many cases, unable to determine which county they are in. Therefore, I am unable to reliably
assign a specific pollution concentration monitor to households in attainment areas. Additionally,
it is not clear which pollution measure to use. For Greenstone and Chay, they investigate Total
Suspended Particles (TSP), and simply use an average concentration level. For ground level
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Ozone, however, temperature and time of day are important determinants of the impact of this
pollutant. I leave these questions for future research, and instead focus on the estimates from my
DiD design.

3.4 Results
Table 3.3 provides the raw DiD results from the data using no controls. The data is
divided into four samples, attainment areas before and after 2003 and non-attainment areas
before and after 2003. The percent of workers who reported they worked part-time last week
because of illness or other health limitations are reported in each cell. The columns are
observations for before and after the treatment period (regulation began in 2004) and the rows
are observations in attainment and nonattainment areas. The first difference is the difference over
time which is shown in the third column. The difference between attainment and nonattainment
areas is the second difference, which is reported in the third row. The difference between these
numbers is the raw DiD estimate. This indicates that the Clean Air Act reduced the probability of
missing work due to illness by about 0.14 percentage points.
Table 3.3: Difference-in-Difference for Probability of Missing Work Due to Illness
PrePostTime
2003
2003
Diff.
Attainment
2.72
2.33
-0.39
Nonattainment
2.34
1.81
-0.53
Group Diff.
-0.38
-0.52
-0.14
Notes: This table shows the uncontrolled DiD estimate for the effect of the 2004 CAAA ozone
restrictions on missed work. The elements inside the borders are each the percent of workers that
indicated that they missed at least one day of work in the previous week due to illness. The far
right column shows the difference before and after the treatment period, and the bottom row
shows the difference between groups in both periods. The difference between these differences is
the raw DiD estimate, which is bolded in the bottom right corner.
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Figure 3.4 also shows the raw DiD estimate by year. For each panel in Figure 3.4, the
horizontal axis is the year and the vertical axis reports the percent of people who reported they
missed work in the reference week. Note that this percentage is expressed relative to 2003 such
that the value in 2003 is zero. The top panel of this figure uses work missed for the given reason
that the respondent was sick. The first interesting observation about both graphs is that the
probability of missing work for either reason seems to have generally trended down during the
sample period. However, the top panel shows that after 2003, non-attainment areas saw a bigger
decrease in the probability of taking a sick day than workers in attainment areas. Additionally,
this effect seems to be absent in the bottom panel, which shows the same calculation using
missed work where the stated reason was vacation time. The bottom panel is something of a
placebo test but not quite. An initial reaction may be that vacation days should not be correlated
with a reduction in pollution. However, workers may take vacations to get away from polluted
areas, so a reduction in pollution may reduce mitigating behavior. However, it seems from this
figure that this is not the case.
In Table 3.4, I present the results from the full DiD regression. The outcome variable is
binary, indicating whether the respondent missed work at all in the reference week. From left to
right, the columns show the results using different reasons given for missing work. The first
column uses all missed days, the second uses missed days because the respondent was sick, and
the third uses missed days because the respondent was on vacation. These are linear probability
models so coefficients can be interpreted as a percentage point change in the probability of
missing work last week. The first column shows the results using all missed days regardless of
their classification by the respondent. This could include missed days due to child care, civic
duties, illness, and vacation days. The results suggest that the policy lowered the probability of
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missing work for any reason by about .5 percentage points. The result for only sick days is
reported in the second column. Here the coefficient is smaller but still statistically significant.
Figure 3.4: Event Study for DiD Results

Notes: This graph shows the raw DiD estimates for each year over the sample period. The
dashed line with red circle points represents the areas designated as attainment, and the blue solid
line with triangle points represents the hourly wage in non-attainment areas. The vertical dashed
line at 2003 indicates the last pre-period year. The top panel uses only days missed where the
respondent indicated that they missed work due to illness. The bottom panel uses only days
missed where the respondent indicated that they missed work due to taking vacation time.
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Table 3.4: Results for Effect of CAAA on All Missed Days, Sick Days, and Vacation Days
(1)
All Days

(2)
Sick Days

(3)
Vacation Days

Non-Attainment X Post

-0.00497
(0.00263)

-0.00110
(0.00053)

-0.00025
(0.00073)

Usual Hours

-0.0193
(0.000268)
0.000956
(5.59e-05)
0.0474
(0.00177)
0.0341
(0.00237)
0.00233
(0.00150)
0.00353
(0.00586)
0.0150
(0.00727)
-0.00619
(0.00374)
-0.00414
(0.00140)

-0.000922
(2.54e-05)
0.000566
(1.29e-05)
0.00566
(0.000358)
-0.00240
(0.000521)
-0.00930
(0.000415)
-0.00657
(0.00187)
-0.0144
(0.00201)
-0.00213
(0.000995)
-0.00163
(0.000384)

-6.04e-05
(1.27e-05)
0.000488
(2.03e-05)
0.00979
(0.000526)
0.00873
(0.000577)
0.00533
(0.000318)
0.0140
(0.000968)
0.0310
(0.00113)
-0.000830
(0.00120)
-0.00236
(0.000457)

VARIABLES

Age
Female
White
Married
High School
College
Non-attainment
Post

Observations
5,472,460
5,472,460
5,472,460
R-squared
0.284
0.009
0.016
Notes: This table reports results from a DiD regression. The coefficient of interest is the
coefficient on the interaction of variables Non-Attainment X Post. This is the difference in
difference treatment effect of the CAAA on the outcome variable. The outcome variable is
binary indicating whether the respondent missed work in the reference week. Three types of
missed work are used: all days, sick days, and vacation days. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.

These results indicate that the policy reduced the probability of taking a sick day by about .1
percentage points. The final column is the same regression, except I use work missed for the
stated reason of vacation time. The last column confirms the visual evidence in Figure 3.4, the
coefficient on the treatment effect for vacation days is small and statistically insignificant,
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indicating that the CAAA had no effect on the probability of taking a vacation day in the
reference week.
I now use an event study framework to probe the robustness of the results in the earlier
section. Results from this exercise are shown in Figure 3.5. For each of the regressions in the
previous section, I interact the difference in attainment status with the year. So, each graph
shows the conditional difference between attainment and non-attainment areas for each year in
comparison to the year 2000. The black line in the middle blue shaded areas is the coefficient,
and the outer shaded areas are the 95% confidence bounds. The top panel shows the change in all
missed days. The results of the previous table are confirmed; after 2003 the coefficient becomes
statistically significantly negative until it begins to trend upward in 2006. The second panel
shows a similar pattern for sick days, except the measure is a bit noisier. In the final years of the
sample, the 95% confidence bounds cross the 0 threshold. The last panel shows the event study
for vacation days. No clear pattern emerges here, and the estimate simply bounces around zero
over the regulation period. There does seem to be a statistically significant rise in vacation time
directly at the beginning of the sample for the years 2001 and 2002. However, the coefficients
quickly revert back to zero for the rest of the sample period. Again, confirming the results found
in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.5: Event Study for DiD Coefficients

Notes: This figure shows the regression results from interacting the difference in attainment
status with each year in my sample period. 2000 is dropped and used as the reference year. The
top panel uses work missed for any reason, the second panel uses work missed due to illness, and
the third panel uses work missed for vacation time. The black line and points are the estimated
coefficients and the blue shaded areas show the 95% confidence bands. The vertical dashed line
at 2003 indicates the last pre-period year.
103

Lastly, I also consider some other specifications of my econometric model. In Table 3.5, I
remove month fixed effects and add year fixed effects. The results are largely the same across all
specifications. The coefficient on the interaction term is slightly smaller for column 3, but this
has the most restrictions, so I am losing a lot of variation between groups. Additionally, the rsquared remains quite small, so I am likely not gaining much explanatory power from adding in
year fixed effects. The final regression results I show are for the sample including hourly wages.
The results of regressions including hourly wages are reported in Table 3.6. The estimates of the
interaction effect on all days and sick days are smaller, but they are going the same direction as
in Table 3.4. These estimates are much noisier due to having to drop most of the sample to
account for missing wages. Additionally, the CPS includes the supplemental questions on
earnings only in March. However, ground level ozone is often created with volatile compounds
combine in hot weather. This makes summer months the most likely times when ozone would
cause respiratory problems. Due to these issues, it is unlikely that I would be able to pick up
effects using only observations during the month of March.
From my preferred specifications, my estimates predict that the probability of missing
work was reduced by about 0.1 percentage points due to the CAAA 2004 Ozone restrictions.
According to CPS data, counties that switched attainment status covered about 30% of the
population in the United States. Since workers missed one day when they did miss work in a
given week, a 0.1 percentage point increase is an decrease of about 2 million sick days. Using an
average daily wage of $114, the benefits from decreased sick leave is approximately $248
million. In their second prospective of the benefits of the CAAA, the EPA estimated that the PM
2.5 and Ozone restrictions of the CAAA decreased sick days by about 13 million in 2010. This is
larger than my estimate, however, it includes all previous Ozone restrictions as well as PM 2.5

104

Table 3.5: Sensitivity Analysis
(1)
Sick Days

(2)
Sick Days

(3)
Sick Days

NonAttain X Post

-0.00110
(0.000533)

-0.00116
(0.000537)

-0.00103
(0.000528)

Usual Hours

-0.000922
(2.54e-05)
0.000566
(1.29e-05)
-0.00240
(0.000521)
0.00566
(0.000358)
-0.00930
(0.000415)
-0.00657
(0.00187)
-0.0144
(0.00201)
-0.00213
(0.000995)
-0.00163
(0.000384)

-0.000925
(2.56e-05)
0.000566
(1.29e-05)
-0.00238
(0.000521)
0.00568
(0.000358)
-0.00926
(0.000412)
-0.00654
(0.00188)
-0.0144
(0.00201)
-0.00207
(0.000999)
-0.00163
(0.000383)

-0.000924
(2.54e-05)
0.000568
(1.29e-05)
-0.00243
(0.000521)
0.00564
(0.000358)
-0.00932
(0.000416)
-0.00656
(0.00187)
-0.0144
(0.00201)
-0.00221
(0.000985)
-0.00492
(0.000498)

0.0584
(0.00305)

X
X
0.0664
(0.00320)

Age
White
Female
Married
HS
CO
NonAttain
Post

Year Fixed Effects
Month Fixed Effects
Constant

X
0.0638
(0.00321)

Observations
5,472,460
5,472,460
5,472,460
R-squared
0.009
0.009
0.009
Notes: This table reports results from a DiD regression. The coefficient of interest is the
coefficient on the interaction of variables Non-Attainment X Post. This is the difference in
difference treatment effect of the CAAA on the outcome variable. The outcome variable is
binary indicating whether the respondent missed work in the reference week. For this table I
considered other specifications including year and month fixed effects.
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Table 3.6: Regressions Including Hourly Wage
(1)
All Days

(2)
Sick Days

(3)
Vacation Days

NonAttain X Post

-0.00310
(0.00184)

-0.000188
(0.000932)

0.000642
(0.00101)

Usual Hours

-0.0263
(4.51e-05)
-0.000831
(6.26e-05)
0.000518
(3.45e-05)
0.0438
(0.000879)
0.0255
(0.00110)
-0.00114
(0.000885)
0.0135
(0.00128)
0.0287
(0.00150)
-0.00317
(0.00135)
-0.00252
(0.00179)

-0.000945
(2.28e-05)
-0.000126
(3.16e-05)
0.000776
(1.74e-05)
0.00603
(0.000444)
-0.00116
(0.000555)
-0.00977
(0.000447)
-0.00393
(0.000649)
-0.0104
(0.000760)
-0.00183
(0.000682)
-0.00227
(0.000535)

8.64e-05
(2.48e-05)
0.00104
(3.43e-05)
0.000509
(1.89e-05)
0.00803
(0.000483)
0.00598
(0.000604)
0.00321
(0.000486)
0.0109
(0.000706)
0.0171
(0.000826)
-0.00129
(0.000741)
-0.00397
(0.000582)

1.178
(0.00469)

0.0609
(0.00231)

-0.0383
(0.00251)

VARIABLES

Hourly Wage
Age
Female
White
Married
High School
College
NonAttain
Post

Constant

Observations
715,894
715,894
715,894
R-squared
0.355
0.008
0.013
Notes: This table reports results from a DiD regression. The coefficient of interest is the
coefficient on the interaction of variables Non-Attainment X Post. This is the difference in
difference treatment effect of the CAAA on the outcome variable. The outcome variable is
binary indicating whether the respondent missed work in the reference week. These regressions
are the same as Table 3.4, except I include the hourly wage. This is only included for the sample
answering questions in March, however, so it drops a great deal of the sample.
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restrictions. Given that restrictions in 1990 were likely larger and particulate matter may have
larger heath effects, I would argue that my results support the EPA estimates of lost work days
from air pollution.

3.4.a Further Research
I am currently focused on three main objectives for future research. The first is including
the PM 2.5 non-attainment counties. Using this policy could help improve my estimates as it
provides more policy variation. The second area of continued research is using an instrumental
variables approach to get point estimates based on some measure of pollution. This may require
more detailed survey data if pollution maps poorly to the data. I will also likely need to use
several measures of Ozone, since it is unclear which is most hazardous for human health. The
third area of continued research is attempting to include hourly wages in the model. It may be
possible to increase my sample size by increasing the number of years. However, this means that
I would have to include years from the Great Recession, which has confounding effects. This
might be able to be mitigated by using CPS datasets that match observations across surveys. If I
assume that a person’s wage does not change over the year, then I can simply assign the wage
observed each March to all other observations for that person.

3.5 Conclusion
There are many potential gains to studying missed work and environmental quality. In
this paper, I have explored the choice a worker faces when deciding whether to take a sick day.
This is important because it can affect how we measure productivity gains from environmental

107

regulation. Less sick leave time is often included in government benefits analysis for pollution
control policies; however, it has not been studied in the causal literature. This effect is effect is a
broader benefit, in that the individual benefits are small, but it effects many more people.
Mortality effects, for example, are a narrow benefit in that it only affects a few people, but the
individual benefits are large.
My results indicate that there is some effect from the CAAA on sick leave from work,
confirming earlier work on pollution and missed work. I find that the CAAA ozone regulations
of 2004 reduced the probability of taking a sick day by 0.1 percentage points. This indicates that
there is some productivity to be gained from environmental regulation. According to the BLS,
there were 139 million employed person in the US in 2004. Using my DiD estimate and the fact
that on average workers missed one day in the previous week when they missed work, the
CAAA decreased sick leave by 3 million days in 2004.
I can also use the estimates from this study to evaluate the predictive ability of the EPA’s
simulation model. The effect I measure in this paper is just from one regulation of the CAAA. If
previous actions had similar effects, then the EPA’s estimate of 17 million fewer sick leave days
seems reasonable. Evaluating the simulation methods used to determine policy impacts is a
necessary endeavor. Computational models are important influences on policy, and researchers
should evaluate how well they perform in predicting policy effects. Using causal empirical
techniques can provide a good framework for doing so.
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Appendix A: Data and Calibration
I use data from the World Input-Output Database to calibrate the model. This data
includes 35 industries, which I aggregate to 15 industries. The WIOD also includes emission data
and energy use by industry, so I can also calibrate emissions. In this section, I first detail how I
aggregate or disaggregate the industries and create the input-output tables used to calibrate the
economic portions of the model. I then detail how I connect data on emissions to the economic
data.
The first task is to create a worldwide input-output table. This is a matrix that shows the
circular flow of goods in an economy. Each row represents an input to the industry listed in the
column. To start, I use the 2011 World Input-Output Table, which represents 35 industries across
40 countries. All other countries are included in a final region termed “rest of the world,” so the
data represents a balanced input-output matrix for the whole world. The 35 original industries
are listed in Table A.1. A code is provided for each industry; those that start with “c” are the
original industries from the WIOD that I start with. The industries with codes that start with “a”
are the added fossil fuel industries. The goal of the process outlined here is to create a balanced
input-output matrix with these three fossil fuel industries separated from the mining industry.
To capture emissions accurately, I need to separate the fossil fuel extraction industries
from the rest of the mining industry. I first disaggregate the “Mining and Quarrying” industry,
which contains the extraction of fossil fuels and all other mined resources. I can do this using a
“use table,” which is available for each country in my data from WIOD. The use table reports
how much of each commodity an industry uses in production. The use tables in the WIOD report
much more detailed subcategories for the mining industry, which are listed in Table A.2. For
each industry, I find the amount of each commodity input as a share of the total mining inputs.
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Table A.1: Industry Aggregation
Code

Detail Name

Agg. Industry

a1

Coal Mining

Coal Extraction

a2

Oil Extraction

Oil Extraction

a3

Gas extraction

Natural Gas Extraction

c1

Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing

Agriculture

c2

Mining and Quarrying

Mining

c3

Food, Beverages and Tobacco

Goods Manufacturing

c4

Textiles and Textile Products

Goods Manufacturing

c5

Leather, Leather and Footwear

Goods Manufacturing

c6

Wood and Products of Wood and Cork

Goods Manufacturing

c7

Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing

Goods Manufacturing

c8

Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel

Petroleum Refining

c9

Chemicals and Chemical Products

Chemical Manufacturing

c10

Rubber and Plastics

Chemical Manufacturing

c11

Other Non-Metallic Mineral

Chemical Manufacturing

c12

Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal

Other Manufacturing

c13

Machinery, Nec

Other Manufacturing

c14

Electrical and Optical Equipment

Other Manufacturing

c15

Transport Equipment

Other Manufacturing

c16

Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling

Other Manufacturing

c17

Electricity, Gas and Water Supply

Utilities

c18

Construction

Construction

c19

Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and
Motorcycles

Consumer Services

c20

Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor
Vehicles

Consumer Services

c21

Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles; Household Repair

Consumer Services

c22

Hotels and Restaurants

Consumer Services

c23

Inland Transport

Transportation
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c24

Water Transport

Transportation

c25

Air Transport

Transportation

c26

Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities

Transportation

c27

Post and Telecommunications

Business Services

c28

Financial Intermediation

Business Services

c29

Real Estate Activities

Business Services

c30

Renting of Equipment and Other Business Activities

Business Services

c31

Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security

Social Services

c32

Education

Social Services

c33

Health and Social Work

Social Services

c34

Other Community, Social and Personal Services

Social Services

c35

Private Households with Employed Persons

Social Services

Table A.2: Sub-Components of Mining Industry
Coal and lignite; peat
Crude petroleum and natural gas
Uranium and thorium ores
Metal ores
Other mining and quarrying
products
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To give a concrete example, we can look at the US’s non-metallic manufacturing industry. This
industry uses $20.5 billion worth of mining inputs. The use table tells us that 32% of mining
inputs are coal, and the rest are metal ores. So, for the non-metallic industry in the US, I assign
32% of mining inputs as coal and the rest as other mining. Using this method, I split inputs for
each industry into coal, oil and gas extraction, and other mining. or the “rest of the world”
region, I use the average shares from all other countries. Once each mining industry is split, I
have essentially created two more industries: coal mining and oil and gas extraction. Now, I turn
to separating natural gas and crude oil.
The use tables can define coal mining and oil and gas extraction, but this is as detailed as
the tables get. So, to separate natural gas from crude oil, I must use the energy use accounts. The
energy use tables are included with WIOD and matched to world input-output tables. The tables
show fuel use by each industry for every country in the dataset. Fuel use is quoted in joules, so I
need to convert these quantities to the units in the input-output matrix, dollars. To do this, I
create a ratio of prices for oil and natural gas per joule. I use data from the Energy Information
Agency (EIA) in the US and the International Energy Agency (IEA) in France. These agencies
give price indices for natural gas and crude oil in standard units. To find a price per joule, I first
calculate average worldwide prices for natural gas and oil in their respective units. For natural
gas, the price is about $3.40 per million British thermal unit (Btu), and for oil the price is $102
per barrel. Using the energy conversion calculators from the EIA, a barrel of oil contains about 6
times as many joules as a Btu of natural gas. Using this, we get that crude oil is about 4.9 times
more expensive than natural gas per joule.
After getting the price ratio, I can then estimate input volumes for oil and natural gas
separately. This process is like the previous separation of coal and oil and gas extraction. For
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each industry, I multiply the joules of crude oil used in production by my price ratio, 4.9, and
take the corresponding shares. So, if an industry in the US used 3,000 Terajoules of crude oil and
5,000 Terajoules of natural gas, then I would estimate 75% of their oil and gas extraction inputs
were crude oil. So, if this spends $20 billion on oil and gas extraction inputs, I would estimate
$15 billion was spent on crude oil and the rest spent on natural gas. This process needs to then be
done for every industry in every country.
Here it is important to note that most crude oil is only used by one industry: petroleum
refining. This makes sense as oil is not really useful until it is refined into a stable petroleum
product. Additionally, the major buyer of natural gas is the electricity and utilities industry. This
essentially means that the price ratio is not a strong determinant of the final data. When I use
other price ratios to check the robustness of the procedure, I get a very similar input-output
matrix. Using the final data and an average price per barrel of $100, my estimates indicate that
the US consumed 17.4 million barrels of oil per day in 2011. This is close to the estimate from
the EIA of 18.8 million barrels per day.
At this point, I have separated the rows of the input-output matrix, and now I need to
construct the columns. To disaggregate the columns of the IO matrix, I would need
disaggregated production data for each of the fossil fuel extraction industries. The energy use
tables show how much of each fossil fuel is used by each industry. WIOD does not show how
much of each industry output is used by each fossil fuel industry. Recall that this is all
aggregated in the “mining” industry in the original data. To separate the columns of the inputoutput matrix, I sum the elements of each row to get the total output for each fossil fuel industry.
I then use the shares of total output to disaggregate the columns. This makes the assumption that
production processes are similar between mining industries.
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This process yields a balanced input-output matrix that includes fossil fuel industries.
This can then be linked to emission data to calibrate the environmental portion of the model. A
visual overview of a simple example is shown in Figure A.1. This figure shows a fabricated
input-output matrix for one country with two industries: agriculture and mining. The mining
industry is then disaggregated into 3 fossil fuel industries and 1 mining industry.

Figure A.1: Example Energy Decomposition of Input-Output Matrix

A.1 Region and Industry Aggregation
I now have a balanced input-output matrix for the world economy that includes fossil
fuels. Table A1 shows the 35 original industries plus the 3 added fossil fuel industries, for a total
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of 38 industries. I now aggregate some of the other 35 industries to create 12 broad economic
industries and 3 fossil fuel industries. The final aggregated group for each industry is listed in the
third column of Table A.1. Aggregation at this point is simple; for each new industry, the rows
and columns are summed to create a new element for the matrix. For example, to create he
“Chemical Manufacturing” industry, I sum the rows for industries c9, c10, and c11 to create one
row for the new aggregated industry group. I then sum the columns for c9, c10, and c11 to create
a new column.
This process creates a new 15 industry input-output matrix for the world. From the 40
countries in the WIOD, I aggregate them into 2 countries and three regions. The first two
countries are the United States (US) and China. The three regions are North America, Europe,
and the Rest of the World. The North America region is the combination of Canada and Mexico,
since these are big trading partners for the US. The second region, Europe, is a combination of
the countries in my data that are a European Union member. The final region, Rest of the World,
is a combination of all the countries left and the world component of the original WIOD matrix.
Each country and its associated group are listed in Table A.3. The second column shows the
name of the country, and the third column shows the region. To create the final dataset, I sum all
the columns and rows by industry across all countries in a region. So, the column for a given
industry in the Europe region would be the sum of the columns for that industry across all
countries in the Europe region.

A.2 Calibration Process
Once the data sources are correctly aggregated, a balanced SAM is produced. This gives
the values of inputs and outputs for each industry as well as final demand for goods and factors.
115

To calibrate the model, I adopt a common strategy of choosing parameters from the literature and
solving for the other parameters to match my SAM. To do this, I assume the SAM economy is in
equilibrium with each price equal to unity.
For the production nests, I first choose the substitution elasticity 𝜎ℎ and I use the input
𝑗
shares to create the alpha parameters for the CES equation. Define 𝑋̂𝑛𝑖 as the share of input 𝑖 in
1

𝑗

the production process of firm 𝑗 in region 𝑛. The share parameters are calibrated as 𝑋̂𝑛𝑖 𝜎ℎ . Once
these are set, I set prices to unity and solve for the gamma parameter in equilibrium using an
𝑗
arbitrary good 𝑘 such that 𝑋̂𝑛𝑘 > 0.

𝑗

𝛾𝑛ℎ =

1−𝜎ℎ
−𝜎ℎ
𝜎ℎ
𝜎
𝑗
𝑗 ℎ 1−𝜎ℎ
𝑋̂𝑛𝑘 (∑𝐻
𝛼
)
𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖
(
)
𝑗
𝛼𝑛𝑘

This process is repeated for all industries and regions for the fossil fuel, intermediate, and
materials nests. The top production nest is calibrated in a similar fashion. There is no need to set
𝑗

an elasticity for this nest since it is Cobb-Douglas. The 𝜔𝑛 parameter is set as the share of
materials input in production for industry 𝑗 in region 𝑛. I then set prices to unity and solve for the
scale parameter:
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝜔𝑛

𝛾𝑛𝑝 = 𝜔𝑛 (
)
𝑗
1 − 𝜔𝑛
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𝑗

𝜔𝑛 −1

Table A.3: Countries and Associated Regions
Abbreviation
AUS
AUT
BEL
BGR
BRA
CAN
CHN
CYP
CZE
DEU
DNK
ESP
EST
FIN
FRA
GBR
GRC
HUN
IDN
IND
IRL
ITA
JPN
KOR
LTU
LUX
LVA
MEX
MLT
NLD
POL
PRT
ROU
RUS
SVK
SVN
SWE
TUR
TWN
USA

Name
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Brazil
Canada
China
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Germany
Denmark
Spain
Estonia
Finland
France
United Kingdom
Greece
Hungary
Indonesia
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Republic of Korea
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Latvia
Mexico
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
SlovakRepublic
Slovenia
Sweden
Turkey
Taiwan
UnitedStates

Region
Rest of the World
Europe
Europe
Europe
Rest of the World
North America
China
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Rest of the World
Rest of the World
Europe
Europe
Rest of the World
Rest of the World
Europe
Europe
Europe
Rest of the World
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Rest of the World
Europe
Europe
Europe
Rest of the World
Rest of the World
United States
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𝑗

The first set of household parameters are those that govern consumption of goods, 𝜃𝑛 ,
which is the share parameter on good 𝑗 for the household in region 𝑛. These are simply
𝑗

consumption shares from the WIOD. Define 𝑐̂𝑛 as the observed real consumption level of good 𝑗
by region 𝑛. Then set the share parameter
𝑗

𝑗
𝜃𝑛

=

𝑐̂𝑛
∑𝐽𝑖=1 𝑐̂𝑛𝑖

The labor-leisure elasticity parameter 𝜈 is set exogenously from the literature. To get the scale
parameter I first need to set a total labor supply. For this, I set the labor supply as equal to total
income for the region. Then using the supply of labor observed in the data, 𝑙̂𝑛 , I set the scale
parameter as:

𝜇𝑛 =

1
1

(𝐿̅𝑛 − 𝑙𝑛 )𝜈

While I use a single elasticity value for the world in this example, in the application these can
vary by industry and region. I do this in the last section of the robustness checks.
The last step is to calibrate the table of carbon coefficients. This is done by first
connecting emissions data from the environmental satellite accounts to fuel consumption data.
𝑓

Define 𝑄̂𝑛 as the total amount of fuel 𝑓 consumed by region 𝑛 measured in billions of $US, and
𝑓
define 𝐸̂𝑛 as the total emissions by region 𝑛 from fuel source 𝑓 measured in gigatons (one

million tons) of CO2. The carbon coefficient for this region’s fuel is defined as

𝑓
𝑐𝑐𝑛

𝑓
𝐸̂𝑛
= 𝑓
𝑄̂𝑛
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This gives the gigatons of CO2 that are emitted on average when one unit of fuel 𝑓 is consumed.
Carbon coefficients are reported in Table A.6.

A.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
In the robustness section of the paper, I randomly draw parameter values to create a grid
to search over. For each variable, I draw a value from a uniform distribution within a specified
range. For production elasticities and the leisure elasticity, I choose a range between -50% and
+50% of the baseline value. This covers most of the estimates that have been found in the
literature. The sector elasticity is varied between 0 and 2. This covers the range of estimates I
found using regression, as well as the possibility of 0, which is perfectly immobile labor. The
carbon coefficients are varied by fuel type, and the range of possible values is between the
maximum and minimum values for each fuel type. The parameters chosen and their respective
ranges are reported in Table A.4.
Table A.4: Ranges for Randomization of Parameter Values
Parameter
Materials elasticity
Intermediate elasticity
Fossil fuel elasticity
Sector elasticity
Leisure elasticity
Coal carbon coefficient
Natural gas carbon coefficient
Refined Petroleum carbon coefficient

Range
Min
0.485
0.44
0.535
0
0.25
0.0200
0.0030
0.0024
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Range
Max
1.455
1.32
1.605
2
0.75
0.0310
0.0073
0.0050

Table A.5: Trade Elasticities
Industry
Coal Extraction
Oil Extraction
Natural Gas Extraction
Agriculture
Mining
Goods Manufacturing
Petroleum Refining
Chemical Manufacturing
Other Manufacturing
Utilities
Construction
Consumer Services
Transportation
Business Services
Social Services

Hertel et. al.
(2007)
6.0
10.4
34.4
5.7
1.8
6.4
4.2
6.6
7.4
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0

Caliendo and Parro
(2015)
15.7
15.7
15.7
8.1
15.7
7.0
51.1
3.2
6.3
4.6
4.6
4.6
4.6
4.6
4.6

Table A.6: Carbon Coefficients
Region
China
Europe
North America
United States
Rest of the World

Coal

Petroleum

0.03098
0.02071
0.02389
0.02986
0.01997

0.00365
0.00236
0.00385
0.00368
0.00505

Natural
Gas
0.00344
0.00723
0.00731
0.00495
0.00295
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Table A.7: Example of a Transportation Matrix for Goods Manufacturing Industry
China

Europe

North
America
$5.05
$4.22
$358.21
$46.90

United
Rest of the
States
World
$10.87
$57.91
$18.22
$201.08
$47.27
$24.37
$1,343.19
$125.74

Total
Demand
$2,650.43
$2,290.84
$454.52
$1,617.31

$2,555.96
$20.64
China
$74.66 $1,992.65
Europe
$14.06
$10.61
North America
$64.10
$37.38
United States
Rest of the
$211.02
$246.37
$15.33
$59.65 $4,126.08 $4,658.44
World
$2,919.80 $2,307.66
$429.71 $1,479.20 $4,535.17
Total Supply
Notes: Each row presents the demand from the region in the first column that is supplied by the
region in the header row. All entries are in Billions of $US.
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Appendix B: Empirical Validation of the Gravity Algorithm
The question might now be asked, how well does my gravity algorithm fit the data? In
this section I use the dataset from the WIOD to test how well the model predicts trade flows
given data on consumption and production. Note that in this section I will not be using the full
CGE model described. Instead, I am using production and consumption amounts observed in the
data to predict trade flows between countries. When I run the policy simulations later in the
paper, these numbers will come from the CGE model to predict trade flows in the counterfactual
equilibrium.
The gravity model I describe outputs a transportation polytope, which by construction
also describes a joint probability function. If I use the marginal probabilities of consumption and
production, then the function is such that it takes in two marginal probability density functions
(PDF) and outputs a discrete joint probability function.
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑃𝑖𝑛 = 𝐶(𝑓 𝑗 (𝑑𝑖 ), 𝑓 𝑗 (𝑠𝑛 ); 𝐀j )
𝑗

Here 𝑃𝑖𝑛 is the probability that a given good 𝑗 is traded between origin 𝑛 and destination 𝑖. This
probability is a function of the PDF of demand in the destination 𝑓 𝑗 (𝑑𝑖 ), the PDF of supply in
the origin 𝑓(𝑠𝑛 ), and a matrix of parameters 𝐀𝑗 . Each element of the matrix is calculated as:
𝑗(𝑡)

𝑗
𝑎𝑛𝑧

𝑋
= 𝑖𝑛
𝑗(𝑡)
𝑋̅
𝑖

Which is just the share of destination 𝑖’s consumption of good 𝑗 that comes from origin 𝑛. I
calculate this parameter using data for a given year 𝑡. For the primary specification, I use the
year prior to the year I am estimating (i.e., if I was predicting trade flows in year 𝑡, I use a matrix
𝑗

parameterized in year 𝑡 − 1). Using this setup, I predict 𝑃𝑖𝑛 and multiply the predicted
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probabilities by total consumption (or production), which gives the predicted trade flow from
region 𝑛 to region 𝑖.
𝑁
𝑗
𝑋̂𝑖𝑛

=

𝑗
𝑃̂𝑖𝑛

𝑗

× ∑ 𝑑𝑞
𝑞=1

The Armington model is specified as the following regression equation from Feenstra et
al. (2018), which is essentially the same form used in Armington (1969).
𝐽

𝑗

ln (

𝑋𝑖𝑛
𝑋𝑖(ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒)

)=

𝑗
𝑌𝑖𝑛

= 𝛽0 +

𝑁

𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑗=1 𝑖=1

𝑗

(

𝑃𝑛
𝑗

𝑃𝑖(ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒)

𝑗

) + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜙𝑛 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜖

𝑗

Here 𝑋𝑖𝑛 is the trade flow of good 𝑗 from origin 𝑛 to destination 𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖(ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒) is total
𝑗

consumption of good 𝑗 from home in destination 𝑖. 𝑃𝑛 is the price of good 𝑗 from origin 𝑛, and
𝑗

𝑃𝑖(ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒) is the home price of good 𝑗 in destination 𝑖. The remaining terms, 𝛾𝑖 , 𝜙𝑛 , and 𝜃𝑗 are
𝑗

fixed effects by destination, origin, and good type, respectively. The Armington elasticity, 𝜎𝑖 ,
𝑗

𝑗

can be calculated as 𝜎𝑖 = 1 − 𝛽𝑖 .
The equation above is estimated using regression and, then using the same data, I predict
𝑗
𝑌̂𝑖𝑛 and use this to predict trade flows.
𝑗
𝑗
𝑋̂𝑖𝑛 = exp(𝑌̂𝑖𝑛 ) 𝑋𝑖(ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒)

𝑗
𝑋̂𝑖𝑛 is the predicted trade flow and 𝑋𝑖(ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒) is the home consumption observed in the dataset.

To create Figure 2.2, I use the Armington model set forth here to predict the trade flows
in the data. In the in-sample panel, this uses all years included in the dataset. In the out-of-sample
panel, I use data from 1995 through 2000 to estimate the coefficients in the model. I then used
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these estimates to predict trade flows in 2011. The gravity model is the same. I use the empirical
version of the gravity model I developed above to predict trade flows. In the in-sample model, I
use the data from the year directly prior to generate 𝐀j and predict a given year’s trade flows. To
create the out-of-sample model, I use data from 2000 to generate 𝐀j and predict trade flows in
the year 2011.
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Table B.1: Mapping Between WIOD Industries and WITS Commodities
WIOD Industry
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
Mining and Quarrying
Food, Beverages and Tobacco
Textiles and Textile Products
Leather, Leather and Footwear
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
Chemicals and Chemical Products
Rubber and Plastics
Other Non-Metallic Mineral
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
Machinery, Nec
Electrical and Optical Equipment
Transport Equipment
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles;
Retail Sale of Fuel
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles
and Motorcycles
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of
Household Goods
Hotels and Restaurants
Inland Transport
Water Transport
Air Transport
Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of
Travel Agencies
Post and Telecommunications
Financial Intermediation
Real Estate Activities
Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities
Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security
Education
Health and Social Work
Other Community, Social and Personal Services
Private Households with Employed Persons

WITS Industry
Animal
Minerals
Food Products
Textiles and Clothing
Footwear
Wood
Miscellaneous
Fuels
Chemicals
Plastic or Rubber
Stone and Glass
Metals
Mach and Elec
Mach and Elec
Transportation
Miscellaneous
Utilities and Construction
Utilities and Construction
Consumer goods
Consumer goods
Consumer goods
Consumer Services
Transportation
Transportation
Transportation
Transportation
Transportation
Business Services
Business Services
Business Services
Consumer Services
Consumer Services
Consumer Services
Consumer Services
Consumer Services

Notes: This table shows how industry categories in WIOD were matched to commodity
categories in WITS.
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Appendix C: Model of Sick Leave
Suppose a sick leave program works like this: each year a worker is allocated a specified
number of paid sick days (possibly based on seniority) which often accrue year over year.
Allowing employees to bank their sick days is sometimes called “carry-over.” If the employee
gets sick, they can still get their wage, but it reduces the number of sick days in their sick leave
bank. When the employee quits or retires, then the employer might pay them for unused days in
their sick leave bank. This policy likely varies widely by company and is called a “cash-out”
rule. I do not know how many sick leave programs allow carry-over and cash-out since I have
not found statistics of the specific clauses of companies. I am mainly using anecdotal evidence to
derive these rules. However, there may be an employer incentive to set up sick leave in this
manner. If employees have several sick days and were about to lose them, then they have a
strong incentive to take them all at one time before leaving. Employers might prefer to avoid this
clumping of absenteeism, and may offer some benefit to be paid for sick days.
Now I turn to the strategic decision of an agent facing the above paid sick leave regime.
Suppose a worker works for two periods and has one period of paid sick leave. He wakes up the
first period and is given a draw - healthy (H) or sick (S), and he is sick with some probability 𝜃.
He can then choose to attend (A) work anyway, or he can choose to take his sick day (D). If he
attends work sick ,he pays some cost (P) which could include utility loss from being miserable at
work or some medical intervention. If he chooses to stay home from work in period 1, he uses
his sick day. If he gets sick again in period two and stays home, he receives no wage for that
period. Finally, if he goes to work in period one he receives 𝑤1. In period two he receives 𝑤2 ,
and If he has not used his sick day, then he will cash it out for an additional benefit b.
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I can solve this simultaneous game by first finding the optimal decision in period 2. First
I assume that a healthy worker always attends (he does not shirk/play hooky). Consider a worker
who gets sick in period 1. If he uses his sick day, he arrives in period 2 with no sick day banked.
If he gets sick again, he will only attend work if Eq. 1 is true.
𝑤2 > 𝑃2

(1)

If he attended work while sick in period 1 then he arrives in period 2 with a sick day banked. If
he gets sick again, he only attends work if it is worth it to get the benefit or if Eq. 2 is true.
𝑏 > 𝑃2

(2)

Note that if 𝑏 = 0 then he will always take his sick day if he is sick. Additionally, notice that a
worker without paid sick leave will attend work if Eq. 1 is true regardless of what happened in
period 1. Now assume that 𝑏 < 𝑤2 and that 𝑃2 ~𝑈(𝑃, 𝑃). So, I can divide up the distribution of
costs like this
Pr(𝑏 < 𝑤2 < 𝑃2 ) = 𝛽 𝐻
Pr(𝑏 < 𝑃2 < 𝑤2 ) = 𝛽 𝑀
Pr(𝑃2 < 𝑏 < 𝑤2 ) = 𝛽 𝐿
𝛽𝐻 + 𝛽𝑀 + 𝛽𝐿 = 1
These are the probabilities of getting high (H), middle (M), and low (L) costs respectively. So, a
person with paid sick leave in the second period has a lower probability of attending work than a
worker without paid sick leave. If a worker with paid sick leave gets sick in the first period and
attends work, his expected payoff from getting sick in the second period is:
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(𝑤1 − 𝑃1 ) + 𝑤2 + 𝛽𝐿 (𝑏 − 𝑃2 )

(3)

If he is healthy in the second period he gets
𝑤1 − 𝑃1 + 𝑤2 + 𝑏

(4)

So, the expected payout from attending work in period 1 is found by taking the expectations of
the payouts in equations 3 and 4. This reduces to:
𝐸(𝐴) = 𝑤1 − 𝑃1 + 𝑤2 + 𝑏 + 𝜃[𝛽𝐿 (𝑏 − 𝑃2 ) − 𝑏]

(5)

Now consider the same worker decides to take his sick day in period 1. If he gets sick in period 2
again, then his expected value from being sick is:
𝑤1 + (1 − 𝛽𝐻 )(𝑤2 − 𝑃2 )

(6)

If he is healthy he gets his wages for both periods:
𝑤1 + 𝑤2

(7)

The expected payout from taking a sick day in period one is then the expectation over payouts in
equations 6 and 7.
𝐸(𝐷) = 𝑤1 + 𝜃[(1 − 𝛽𝐻 )(𝑤2 − 𝑃2 )]

(8)

I can now find the optimal decision for a sick worker in period 1. This worker will attend work in
period 1 if equation 5 minus equation 8 is greater than zero. Using this I get the rule that a sick
worker will attend work in period 1 if
𝑃1 < 𝑤2 + 𝑏 + 𝜃[𝛽𝐿 (𝑏 − 𝑃2 ) − (1 − 𝛽𝐻 )(𝑤2 − 𝑃2 ) + 𝑤2 − 𝑏]
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(9)

I again assume that 𝑃1 ~𝑈(𝑃, 𝑃), so that the probability of attending work is the probability that
the worker in the first period gets a cost lower than the right-hand side of equation 9. Since this is
drawn from a uniform distribution, the probability of attending work sick falls as the right-hand
side decreases.
To simplify equation 9, I will look at the limiting case where there is no cash-out option
(b = 0). So now equation 9 becomes
𝑃1 < 𝑤2 + 𝜃[𝑤2 − (1 − 𝛽𝐻 )(𝑤2 − 𝑃2 )]

(10)

Now consider a policy that decreases 𝜃. In the context of this paper ,this is a policy that reduces
pollution and the likelihood of getting sick. The term in brackets on the right-hand side is
positive since the worker will only attend work if they get 𝑃2 < 𝑤2 . However, this means that a
decrease in 𝜃 leads to a decrease in the probability of attending work in period 1. This conclusion
is the thrust of my argument. If the risk of getting sick in the future is lower, then the benefit to
attending work and saving a sick day is lower as well. So, workers with paid sick leave may be
more likely to take sick days if the probability of getting sick in the future falls.
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